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1. Introduction:
The main goal of this study, carried out by the author on behalf of the Swiss Defence Procurement Agency
(DPA), was to characterise existing technologies, and identify corresponding commercially available
systems, for the direct detection of explosives for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks. Systems
should be able to determine if a given piece of munition contains explosives or is inert, and ideally in the
former case to establish the type of explosive (see also Annex A2.1). This will be often referred to in the
following as the “task at hand”, or the “task of interest to us”. Note that the object in questions has
already been detected by other means (usually visually, e.g. lying on the surface) – what is needed is the
capacity to characterise its contents (explosive or inert).
Systems should preferably be able to make a detection under the following assumptions:
 The object under analysis should NOT be moved (at least as long as the state of the detonator is
unknown). It should preferably also NOT be touched nor swiped.
 The UneXploded Ordnance (UXO) is at least partially visible; it could nevertheless still be
necessary to detect the explosive in the earth, i.e. buried explosive material.
 Explosives of primary interest are those based on TNT, RDX (Hexogen), PETN (Nitropenta),
HMX (Octogen), and possibly picric acid for older munition. Explosives of secondary interest are
black powder, ammonium nitrate, and phosphorus (in incendiary devices).
 Minimum interesting explosive mass is in the 50 gram range.
 The system has to be fairly mobile.
 (If possible) Priority should be given to the detection of Nitrogen (N), Oxygen (O) and Carbon (C)
(in particular N and O).
It was in fact agreed to keep the target application and audience somewhat larger at the beginning of the
study, before focussing on the task at hand. This on one hand in order to profit from input coming from
related fields (in particular airport security, counterterrorism, customs applications, demining tasks, and
detection of chemical weapons), on the other hand in order not to exclude possible applications of a system
designed for EOD tasks to those same fields.
This broader, initial goal did therefore include the study of commercially available systems for the direct
detection of explosives, in sealed (e.g. UXO) as well as non-sealed systems (e.g. “suspicious objects”). The
main conclusions will then again be focussed on the task at hand. At first sight bulk explosive detection
would seem to be most appropriate for hermetically as well as some non-hermetically sealed systems,
whereas trace detection would seem to be most appropriate for non-hermetically sealed systems. We will try
to see in the following up to which extent this is true.
DISCLAIMER
This report is based on public material. A number of companies or organisations developing and producing
explosive detection systems are cited for illustrative purposes. These references are not all-inclusive and do
not represent endorsement of the corresponding systems.
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1.1. Properties of Explosives:
A few physical and chemical properties of basic explosives are summarised in Table 1 (the information has
been mostly assembled from [YIN99], as well as from [NIJ99a] and [NIJ98]):
Name Molecular
Weight
C H N O Density
(g/cm3)
Vapour Pressure
(rel. | Torr)
Preferred
Trace Det.
TNT 227.13 7 5 3 6 1.65 7.7 ppb | 5.8·10–6 (25 °C) Particle (Vap.)
RDX 222.26 3 6 6 6 1.83 6.0 ppt | 4.6·10–9 (25 °C) Particle
HMX 296.16 4 8 8 8 1.96 3.95 ppt | 3·10–9 (100 °C!) Particle
Tetryl 287.15 7 5 5 8 1.73 7.5 ppt | 5.7·10–9 (25 °C) Particle
PETN 316.2 5 8 4 12 1.78 18 ppt | 1.4·10–8 (25 °C) Particle
NG 227.09 3 5 3 9 1.59 0.41 ppm | 3.1·10–4 (26 °C) Vapour
EGDN 152.1 2 4 2 6 1.49 92.6 ppm | 0.07 (25 °C) Vapour
AN 80.05 – 4 2 3 1.59 12 ppb | 9.1·10–6 (25 °C) Particle (Vap.)
TATP 222.23 9 18 – 6 1.2
DNB 168.11 6 4 2 4 1.58 3.8 ppm | 2.9·10–3 (25 °C)*
Picric acid 229.12 6 3 3 7 1.76 7.6 ppt | 5.8·10–9 (25 °C)*
Table 1: Properties of some basic explosives (source: mostly [YIN99], also [NIJ99a, NIJ98]; *: calculated from
[ROS91])
TNT (2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene) is one of the most widely used military explosives, and has been in use for
about the last 100 years (most of the production during WWI and WWII). DNB (1,3-Dinitrobenzene) was
produced in large quantities during WWI (in second place after TNT), and to a lesser extent during WWII.
Picric acid (2,4,6-trinitrophenol) has been the third most produced explosive during WWI, and to a much
lesser extent during WWII. RDX (Hexogen) is more recent, was the second most produced explosive during
WWII and is still in very wide use today, also in plastic explosives2. PETN (Nitropenta) is also used in
plastic explosives. HMX (Octogen) is a very powerful and costly military explosive, which has been
employed in solid-fuel rocket propellants and in military high performance warheads. As general references
see also [YIN99, HAA94].
Military explosives currently used are mostly a combination of TNT, RDX, PETN, HMX, with a number of
organic compounds (waxes, plasticizers, stabilisers, oils, etc.). Examples3 are Composition B (RDX, TNT),
Composition C-4 (or PE 4) (RDX), Detasheet (PETN), Octol (HMX, TNT), Semtex-H (RDX, PETN), etc.
[YIN99].
Nitroglycerin (NG) and Ammonium Nitrate (AN, NH4NO3) are used as a basis of other families of
explosives (dynamites in the case of NG), typically as high explosive for industrial applications and in solid
rocket propellants. Note that pure AN does not contain carbon; it has been widely used to fabricate bombs,
but is also widely diffused as a fertiliser. EGDN (Ethylene glycol dinitrate) is a transparent, colourless liquid
explosive, which has been used in mixtures with NG for low-temperature dynamites. Its use has greatly
decreased due to the replacement of dynamites with ammonium nitrate-fuel oil (ANFO) and slurry
explosives [YIN99].
Black powder is a low-order explosive consisting of potassium nitrate (KNO3) or sodium nitrate (NaNO3),
charcoal, and sulphur (it does therefore probably not contain hydrogen). It is used in incendiary devices and
as low-order high explosive.
                                                     
2
 Plastic explosives are high-explosive materials that have the general consistency of plastic. They are usually based on RDX and/or
PETN. Examples include C-4, Detasheet, and Semtex [NIJ99a].
3
 The main high explosive components are reported in brackets.
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1.1.1. Chemical Composition:
All high explosives contain inside the molecule the oxygen necessary for the explosive reaction, with the
most important oxygen carriers being organic nitro compounds, nitrates, chlorates and perchlorates. Nitrogen
is also contained in all the explosives listed above. Explosives are therefore composed of Carbon (C),
Hydrogen (H), Nitrogen (N) and Oxygen (O) (with the few exceptions listed above, at least concerning the
basic explosives), and many other organic compounds. Elemental ratios for some common basic explosives
are reported in Table 2, derived from Table 1.
Explosives are, as a group, rich in nitrogen and oxygen, poor in carbon and hydrogen, with a particularly
characteristic indicator being the oxygen vs. nitrogen atomic density (in mol/cm3, see for ex. Fig. 3.4
[YIN99]). It would nevertheless be necessary, for the application we are considering, to compare the
composition of explosives with the inert substances of interest, rather than with the materials commonly
employed in security studies (e.g. clothing or plastics, see for example [YIN99]).
Name C/O H/N C/N O/N Nitrogen
(weight %)
NG 0.33 1.67 1 3 18.5
TNT 1.17 1.67 2.33 2 18.5
RDX 0.5 1 0.5 1 38.0
PETN 0.42 2 1.25 3 17.7
AN 0 2 0 1.5 35.0
Table 2: Elemental ratios for some common basic explosives, derived from Table 1 (last col.: [YIN99], Table 3.4)
1.1.2. Vapour Pressure:
We recall that all solids and liquids emit a certain amount of vapour (usually rapidly increasing with
temperature), and that the pressure of the gas phase above them is called vapour pressure. Its value
corresponds actually to the maximum pressure of the gas which exists above the substance’s surface, for
example in the space above some TNT contained in closed bottle, when equilibrium has been reached (as
many molecules evaporate from the substance’s surface as are reabsorbed). The vapour pressure is therefore
a very important indicator of how easily a substance tends to evaporate, and therefore of how likely a
detection as vapour is going to succeed. See also [DIO86, ROS91].
The vapour pressures for mixtures containing pure explosives, e.g. C-4 containing RDX, may in fact be
lower [NIJ99a, YIN99 §2.3] than the values quoted in Table 1 for pure materials, and change from one
mixture to the other even if the basic explosive is the same and in the same quantity. Reasons for this include
the presence of other substances in the explosive matrix, such as polymeric binders, plasticizers and/or
waxes. In addition, in real world situations equilibrium might not be reached due to a number of factors
affecting the diffusion and transport of explosive material, such as: packaging and encapsulation, stagnant
reflective boundary layer effects, temperature fluctuations, uncontrolled air currents or adhesion of vapour to
surrounding surfaces [NAV97, §2.1.2.1.2; NAV9x, NIJ98]. As a result, the actual vapour pressure can be
orders of magnitude lower than the values quoted for equilibrium situations [NIJ98], such as those in Table
1. All this obviously affects detection efficiency. On the other hand high vapour pressure impurities might be
present, thus potentially facilitating detection.
Vapour pressures are often expressed as relative concentrations in saturated air, rather than in true pressure
units, and are usually expressed in units of ppm (parts per million: 1:106, corresponding to one molecule per
one million air molecules), ppb (parts per billion, 1:109), or ppt (parts per trillion, 1:1012). Such
concentrations are proportional to the true vapour pressure (in torr, or Pascal), as in a given volume and at
the same temperature nexpl/nair = pexpl/pair. Indeed, for an ideal gas we have the following relationship between
the (vapour) pressure p (in Pascal, with 1 Torr = 133 Pa), the volume V (m3), the quantity of gas n measured
in moles (e.g. 1 mole TNT = 227.13 grams), and the absolute temperature T in Kelvin (0 °C ~ 273 K):
pV = nRT => n/V = p/RT
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with R being the universal gas constant (8.31 J·mol–1·K–1). The TNT relative concentration at 25 °C for
example amounts to 5.8·10–6 torr, or 7.7 ppb, corresponding to about 0.07 ng/cm3 (1 ng = 10–9 g). An order of
magnitude figure for TNT of 0.1 ng/cm3 is often encountered. Note that this figure is very small compared to
the amount of TNT contained in a typical particle in a fingerprint for example, which might contain several
micrograms of TNT (1 µg = 10–6 g = 1000 ng) [NIJ99a].
As we said the vapour pressure increases quite rapidly with temperature; in the case of solid TNT near room
temperature for example it approximately doubles every 5 °C. On the other hand this also implies that
explosive vapour detection can become difficult in cold environments, see for example [NAV9x]. One way
of increasing the chances of a successful vapour detection might therefore be to heat the object (this could
however also increase the amount of interfering vapours).
ppm range or higher:
EGDN and NG have relatively high vapour pressures (ppm range or higher), which implies that they and
their compounds (typically dynamites) are correspondingly “easy” to detect in the vapour phase with existing
commercial equipment (e.g. of the IMS or ECD type) and also by the human nose. As a downside of the high
vapour pressure, their particle detection might also be possible but less effective due to the tendency of small
particles to evaporate rapidly.
ppb range:
TNT and AN vapour pressures are already in the ppb range and therefore correspondingly difficult to detect
in the vapour phase, pushing in many cases the required sensitivity to the detection system’s limits. Particle
detection based on surface swiping is therefore usually preferred, with AN being somewhat a special case.
(sub-)ppt range:
RDX, Tetryl and PETN and their compounds (in particular plastic explosives, and also explosives based on
potassium and sodium chlorate) have a very low tendency to evaporate (ppt range4), with HMX being even a
couple of orders of magnitude lower (sub-ppt range at room temperature). This makes their vapour based
detection indeed very difficult, so that a lot of effort has gone into providing detection of particulate material
instead.
1.1.3. Particle Detection:
Particle (or particulate) contamination consists of microscopic solid particles, often with masses on the order
of a few micrograms (many particles will be contained in a typical fingerprint) [NIJ99a]. As explosives tend
to be rather “sticky” – they adhere well on surfaces5 – someone handling a macroscopic piece of it will for
example quickly contaminate his or her hands, as well as any additional surfaces that are touched by the
hands. Reducing the spread of particulate contamination to zero is actually extremely difficult. As an
example, [NAP99] reports that tests using C4 explosives as a model material suggest that, even with a 10%
collection efficiency, enough material is left from tenth-generation fingerprints (!) to be detected by current
trace explosives detection systems.
Particle detection itself can be carried out by wiping a surface with a swipe pad, usually provided by the
equipment manufacturer himself, which will the be inserted in the instrument’s sampling port and be
analysed. More details will be provided later on. Sample collection and transport to the detector are
therefore indeed key issues [NIJ99b, NAV97]. More details on the factors influencing contact trace detection
are provided in [NAV97 §2.1.2.2, NAP99].
                                                     
4
 Some doubts exist on the RDX and PETN values (in some cases the vapour pressure of RDX has been quoted as being larger than
that of PETN), but their order of magnitude is correct.
5
 Similar arguments hold by the way for the soil in case of buried explosives (§4.2.1).
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1.1.4. Tagging:
Substances can be added to explosives at the time of manufacture, usually in small amounts, to facilitate its
detection (Detection taggants) and/or its identification after explosion (Identification taggants). Detection
taggants are typically high vapour pressure compounds (which therefore evaporate much more easily than
the explosive itself), such as EGDN, ortho-mononitrotoluene (o-MNT), para-mononitrotoluene (p-MNT),
and dimethyldinitrobutane (DMNB) [YIN99]. These substances have vapour pressures similar to those of
NG and their presence makes vapour detection of explosives, plastic ones in particular, possible. Tagging,
although useful, does however not represent the ultimate solution of the detection problem. Additional
considerations on the tagging procedure are for example detailed in [YIN99] and [NAV97]. Detection of
taggants is also discussed in [NAV9x].
1.2. Properties of some INERT Fillers:
As said initially, the main task at hand is identifying a UXO as inert or filled with explosives. The inert
substances used do often share physical properties similar to those of explosives, such as the density (e.g. to
simulate the same ballistic behaviour). The following substances have been quoted as possible fillers of inert
munition (where possible the chemical composition is indicated) – note that most of them do not contain
nitrogen:
 Hard metals (e.g. tungsten and alloys) as cores of kinetic projectiles;
 Concrete (cement + gravel) in practice bombs (Ca4(OH)2Si6O15·3 H2O, + Al2O3 and Fe2O3 in
variable quantity);
 Plaster (gypsum) in practice shells (CaSO4·2 H2O, dihydrate);
 Sand (mainly SiO2) and Earth (see below);
 Loam or other plasticines (e.g. magnesium based);
 Wax and wax based mixtures;
 Synthetic resins which can be casted (moulded);
 Other density calibration (tare) substances based for example on stearin (high H content) or
carnauba wax (high H density), and quartz flour (mainly SiO2). The addition of hematite (Fe3O4) is
also possible;
 Air;
 Water or glycerine and sugar (in inert versions of chemical munition).
Note that the earth’s crust eight main components are: oxygen (49.5%), silicon (25.8%), aluminium (7.5%),
iron (4.7%), calcium 3.4%), sodium (2.6%), potassium (2.4%), magnesium (1.9%) [HUS99]. Local
variations are obviously possible. A “standard” soil contains therefore very little nitrogen, with the exception
of areas with high fertiliser content or possibly in presence of vegetation/organic material.
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1.3. Composition of some Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA):
We will briefly mention bulk explosive detection of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA), which relies on the
detection of characteristic elements such as Arsenic (As), Bromine (Br), Chlorine (Cl), Fluorine (F),
Phosphorus (P), and Sulphur (S). Table 3 reports therefore the composition of some CWA, without
entering into further details.
Name C H N O Cl P As S F
Lewisite I 2 2 – – 3 – 1 – –
Lewisite II 4 4 – – 3 – 1 – –
Lewisite III 6 6 – – 3 – 1 – –
Clark I (DA) 12 10 – – 1 – 1 – –
Clark II (DC) 13 10 1 – – – 1 – –
S-Mustard (HD) 4 8 – – 2 – – 1 –
N-Mustard (HN) 6 12 1 – 3 – – – –
Tabun (GA) 5 11 2 2 – 1 – – –
Sarin (GB) 4 11 – 2 – 1 – – 1
Soman (GD) 7 16 – 2 – 1 – – 1
VX 11 26 1 2 – 1 – 1 –
Table 3: Composition of some Chemical Warfare Agents (data source: I.U.T. “GIOS” brochure)
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The following Figure provides a useful overview, albeit non-exhaustive, of current Bulk and Trace explosive
detection technologies of interest, most of which we are going to discuss in the following.
Figure 1: Organization of Current Explosive Detection Technologies (adapted from [NAV97, Fig. 2.1-1])
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2. BULK Explosive Detection Technologies:
Direct detection of a macroscopic mass of explosive material, or bulk explosive detection, can be carried out
using some type of probing radiation, which has to penetrate the explosive’s container(s) and possibly the
earth as well in case of buried objects. This restricts the choice to the use of electromagnetic radiation,
usually either radiowaves or microwaves (plus static magnetic fields if necessary), X-rays and gamma rays,
as well as neutrons. Note that in general there are limited probabilities that the interrogating energy will
interact with the target material and limited chances of detecting the return emission [NAV97] (we will have
a brief look into the different factors of interest for the gamma ray spectrum in §2.3).
In the following we will give the priority to the physics behind existing systems or advanced prototypes. For
additional interesting comments on bulk explosive detection see also [NAV97, McF80 and McF91,
NAP98b].
2.1. X-ray Based Detection Systems:
High energy electromagnetic radiation is usually called X-rays or gamma rays according to how it has been
generated (outside or inside the atomic nucleus respectively):
 X-rays are produced when electrons from outer orbits fall into a vacant inner orbit (typically
produced when a fast electron hits an atom). Their energy is equal to the difference of the two
energy levels involved (corresponding to the two orbits) and is usually expressed in units of
electron Volts (eV), whereby 1 eV = 1.6 10–19 Joule = energy acquired by an elementary charge,
such as an electron, when accelerated by a potential of 1 Volt. The X-rays useful for the detection
of explosives have energies starting from several keV up to several MeV, i.e. wavelengths in the
range 10–8-10–11 cm. In fact there is no precise definition of the high-energy limit of the energy of
X-rays (i.e. when to start speaking of gamma instead of X-rays), although about one MeV
constitutes a reasonable separation.
 Gamma (γ) rays are electromagnetic radiation of nuclear rather than atomic origin, and are
produced as a consequence of nuclear reactions or radioactive decays. Their energy starts from
about a hundred keV.
The absorption of an X-ray or γ-ray beam through a material is described by [YIN99]:
I = I0e−µlρ
where I is the intensity of the emergent beam (photons/s), I0 the intensity of the incident beam, µ the total
mass attenuation coefficient (describing both absorption and scattering) in cm2/g, l the length of path through
the absorbing material (cm), and ρ the density of the absorbing material (g/cm3). The mass attenuation
coefficient µ depends on the energy E of the X-rays and on the effective atomic number Zeff of the absorbing
material; µ decreases for increasing X-ray energy (the beam is less attenuated). Zeff is, for a substance made
up of more than one element, the apparent atomic number that results if the substance is treated as if it were
composed only of a single element [NIJ99a]. It is closely related to the weighted average of the atomic
numbers (Zi) of the constituent elements, i.e. to the average number of electrons per atom6.
In the case of X-rays their absorption is basically due to the X-ray’s interaction with an atom’s electrons, via
the photoelectric effect (the X-ray is absorbed and knocks out one of the atom’s internal electrons) or via
Compton scattering (the X-ray hits an electron and transfers part of its energy to it, therefore continuing with
reduced energy). Positron-electron pair production in the field of a heavy atom can occur at high energies,
above 1.022 MeV.
All of the X-ray based systems involve irradiation of a target item with X-rays, usually followed by detection
of an image created by X-rays that are either transmitted7 or backscattered8 by the item. Standard
                                                     
6
 The atomic number Z of an element is equal to the number of protons in the nucleus of an atom of that element, and therefore to the
number of electrons in the atom’s shell (for a neutral atom).
7
 X-ray detector on opposite side to X-ray source.
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(transmission) X-ray machines have been used for quite a long time, but more in the role of systems to
detect weapons and clues to the explosive device such as switches, detonators, wires, etc., rather than the
explosive itself [NIJ99a]. Standard airport X-ray machines operate with electron energies of 120 keV
impinging on tungsten targets, and the resulting X-ray beam has the characteristic energy of tungsten (~60
keV) [YIN99]. Higher energy machines should be capable of penetrating a few cm (2-3) of steel, and even
more for increasing energy.
In order to provide an operator with identification of explosives-like substances (high density9, low Z
material), i.e. real bulk explosive detection, other X-ray technologies like backscatter, dual energy, or
computed tomography and combinations thereof have to be employed. The parameter of interest is actually
Zeff, the effective atomic number of the screened item (replace in the following paragraphs Z by Zeff).
 Backscatter systems produce an image from X-rays that are scattered back from the screened
object towards the source (not only transmitted as in the standard machines described above).
Because low-Z materials are more efficient at scattering X-rays, explosive-like materials are more
contrasted – they stand out clearly – in the backscatter image, while they often are barely visible in
the transmitted image (low contrast). The backscatter image is indeed usually most effective for
the detection of low-Z materials such as explosives, while the transmission image is most useful
for viewing metals. Backscatter systems can display both the backscatter and transmission images.
Quantitatively, a measure of the backscattered X-rays together with the standard absorption
measurement provides information which can help in separating the effects of density and effective
atomic number Zeff, in order to identify high density, low Zeff materials (the signature of
explosives).
 Dual energy X-ray systems yield superior material discrimination through comparison of the
attenuation of X-ray beams at two energies. Thus, identification of low-Z materials can be
achieved by using incident X-ray beams of two distinct energies. Materials of specific Z numbers
(the same effective Z as explosives) can be clearly highlighted for the operator by adding colour to
the image. A material that has a high Z number (metals) is often coloured green, while low-Z
materials are coloured orange, and materials with the same Z as explosives are red (not to be
confused with colorised images displayed instead of black and white ones on some standard
transmission systems). The lower the X-ray energy, the better the discrimination power, but lower
energy photons are strongly absorbed [YIN99].
 Computed Tomography (CT) is an even more sophisticated X-ray technique in which cross-
sectional images (“slices”) through an object are numerically reconstructed from X-ray projections
at various angles around the object. These cross-sectional images can be added together to produce
a three dimensional image (as in medical CAT scans). Along with the three-dimensional image,
the effective Z number is calculated and materials with the same Z number as explosives can be
identified. For details see [YIN99, NIJ98].
Any system that can determine that low-Z materials are present can have an automated alarm function
added. A number of (mostly American) commercial systems are for example listed in Table 6, page 32 of
[NIJ99a]. Additional details on X-ray techniques can also be found in [NIJ98, NAV97].
These systems are mostly used for screening luggage, packages, mail, etc., and most of them are not easily
portable. A few are usable for EOD tasks, but not to detect the explosive directly, rather to get information
on the object’s internal structure, which can already be very useful. See also the comments in Annex A2.1,
A2.2.
                                                                                                                                                                               
8
 X-ray detector on same side as X-ray source
9
 Compared to similar innocuous material.
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2.2. Elements of Neutron Physics and Properties:
Neutrons are electrically neutral particles and can therefore interact only with nuclei (and not with the atom’s
electrons for example), see also [GOZ96]. Because of the short distance action of nuclear forces even low
energy neutrons can therefore still penetrate thick substances, which is needed for the application at hand: 1-
2 cm of steel and 20-30 cm of earth should be feasible, although with increasing attenuation for increasing
thickness.
The behaviour of neutrons in matter depends strongly on their kinetic energy. Fast neutrons interact
preferentially via scattering and nuclear reactions (see below). The probability of reaction (cross section) for
slow neutrons (E<0.5 eV, definitions vary) changes instead heavily from one element to the other and
according to the neutron energy, and is determined by individual resonances which feature as peaks in the
cross section plots. The latter can be very large, which indicates a high reaction probability at the
corresponding neutron energy. Thermal neutrons are a special type of slow neutrons, whose kinetic energy
distribution is in equilibrium with their surrounding (with a typical energy of 0.025 eV at room temperature).
They move on irregular paths like a gas through matter, neither accelerating nor slowing down, scattering
quite a number of times until they are absorbed (captured in the nucleus). In detail, neutrons can interact with
matter in the following ways:
 Elastic scattering with nuclei (similarly to the collision of two billiard balls). The kinetic energy
loss (speed loss) per collision depends strongly on the mass of the nucleus the neutron is hitting: if
the latter is large, the incoming neutron will practically not loose energy10, if it is small (like for
hydrogen) the incoming neutron can loose up to its entire kinetic energy. Hydrogen rich material
such as polyethylene is therefore often used to slow down fast neutrons. Note that the target
nucleus is not excited (i.e. stays in the ground state). The reaction is therefore of the X(n,n')X
type11.
Elastic scattering dominates for slow neutrons.
 Inelastic scattering with nuclei: when the incoming neutron has a sufficient kinetic energy
(usually > 100 keV for heavy nuclei and > some MeV for light nuclei) it can put the nucleus being
hit in an excited state, which decays in a very short time to its ground state (say less than 10–12
sec), releasing the energy difference as a γ-ray of characteristic energy. The latter is also called a
“prompt” γ-ray as it is emitted so shortly after the collision. The incoming fast neutron continues
with a reduced kinetic energy. The reaction is therefore of the X(n,n'γ)X type.
Inelastic scattering dominates for fast neutrons.
 Nuclear reactions with the production of charged particles or additional neutrons, usually starting
from a given energy (a threshold), often a few MeV12, as they “consume” energy which has to be
taken from the incoming neutron’s kinetic energy. A nuclear reaction has often as consequence an
activation of the material, i.e. the nucleus which has been hit becomes radioactive. This
radioactivity can be short lasting (e.g. milliseconds or seconds). If the nuclei decay emitting γ-rays,
these will be called delayed γ-rays (in contrast to the prompt ones mentioned above). Examples
are nuclear reactions of the X(n,α)Y, X(n,p)Y, X(n,2n)Y type.
 Neutron capture does preferentially take place when the neutron has sufficiently low energy, i.e.
for slow neutrons, and is particularly important for certain nuclei at one or more specific energies
(“resonances”). The resulting nucleus can decay in a number of ways, according to the type of
target nucleus and energy of the incoming neutron, including by emission of a prompt γ-ray, again
characteristic of the target nucleus; this type of reaction is therefore of the AZ (n,γ)A+1Z type.
Concerning the orders of magnitude of the physical processes involved, fast neutrons are thermalised
(slowed down to thermal energies) on a µsec timescale, whereas neutrons diffuse on a msec scale [McF80].
                                                     
10
 Think of a small fast ball hitting a large one nearly at rest.
11
 The following notation is used for nuclear reactions: X(a,b)Y, with a=projectile particle, X=target nucleus, b=emitted particle,
Y=resulting nucleus. Particles of interest to us are neutrons (n), gamma rays (γ), etc.
12
 Apart from some exceptions such as 10B, 6Li, 7Li, 3H, 14N.
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tasks)
Page 14
Note that from a biological point of view thermal neutrons are less dangerous than fast neutrons (higher
fluxes of thermal neutrons can be tolerated). Fast neutrons have a greater range in target materials and thus
allow detection of larger and/or more dense volumes.
2.3. Gamma Spectroscopy Neutron Based Techniques:
There are several neutron-based techniques for detecting explosives in bulk form, see for example [GOZ96]
for an overview of some neutron based inspection techniques as well as for the description of some
prototypes or existing systems (at the time of writing). Among these we have in particular a class of systems
relying on gamma spectroscopy, in which the γ-rays resulting from the previously described interactions
are characterised with respect to their energy and intensity. We note in passing that the γ-ray spectra contain
a wealth of information, in particular on the chemical elements of the substance under analysis, but not on its
molecular structure. The γ-rays produced are also far reaching, being able to traverse the thicknesses
involved in the task at hand (the better the higher their energy).
All systems of this type, such as Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) and Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) as well
as their derivatives, are composed of at least a neutron source to produce the neutrons that have to be
directed into the target, and a γ-ray detector to characterise the outgoing radiation. The neutron source can
be either a radioactive source or an accelerator, possibly moderated (exploiting hydrogen rich substances to
slow down fast neutrons using elastic scattering):
 Typical radioactive sources are Californium-252 (252Cf), with a half-life of about 2.6 years (one
µg 252Cf produces about 2.3·106 n/s), or Americium-Beryllium (AmBe), which produces neutrons
via the 9Be(α,n)12C reaction (241Am has a half-life of 458 years). 252Cf neutrons produced by
spontaneous fission have a lower energy spectrum (average energy of 2.1 MeV, most probable
energy of 0.7 MeV); this source is therefore more indicated to produce thermal neutrons.
 Neutron generators (small accelerators) can also be used as sources, usually either of the D-D
(deuterium-deuterium, D(D,n)3He), or D-T (deuterium-tritium, T(D,α)n) type13; the first produce
fast neutrons of 2.5 MeV, the second fast neutrons of 14 MeV. The 9Be(D,n)10B reaction can also
be used. The yield of a D-D generator is usually lower than that of a D-T by one to two orders of
magnitude, but this might be (more than?) counterbalanced by a reduced background. Note that
these generators do emit isotropically, i.e. in all directions (4pi). They can work in either a
continuous mode, or in bursts (pulsed operation) as short as a few µsec. The D-D generator has the
advantage of not containing any radioactive material, whereas the D-T contains tritium (which is
radioactive) and this can complicate its acquisition and transport. Work is ongoing on different
types of generator, such as the so-called plasma focus, which will be able to produce very short
pulses (in the nsec range).
Radioactive sources have the advantage of being cheaper and smaller than accelerators, but can obviously
not be “turned off”. They are more “portable” but have to be transported in special containers (for the
shielding) and might require quite some paperwork, according to the actual source strength, as well as
dedicated personnel; on the other hand it is true that they are routinely used in a number of applications.
They have to be changed at regular intervals, say after one or two half-lives (e.g. max 5 years for the 252Cf
one), which obviously matters only for those with a short half-life.
The neutron generators have reached quite reasonable sizes, still weighing several tens of kilograms, high
voltage electronics included, and throughputs of 108 to 109 neutrons/s (for the smaller models). Prices start
somewhere around 50 kCHF, but are more in the 100 kCHF range. The ability of pulsing them can be of
great advantage in reducing the background signal, allowing for example to differentiate prompt from
delayed γ-rays (which will occur after the pulse), or γ-rays due to inelastic scattering from those due to
neutron capture of thermal neutrons. Nevertheless, detecting the γ-rays during the pulse can be difficult,
depending on the detector and its electronics, in particular for intense pulses. They are commercially
available from a few manufacturers such as SODERN in France, http://www.sodern.fr/, MF-Physics in the US,
                                                     
13
 Deuterium (D or 2H), is a naturally occurring hydrogen isotope, whereas Tritium (T or 3H) is beta radioactive with a half-life of
about 12 years.
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http://www.mfphysics.com/, Schlumberger in the US, http://www.slb.com/emr/generators/, and the Institute of
Automatics in Moscow, Russia [RAN99] (plus possibly other Russian sources). Neutron generators are
routinely used for other applications such as in the oil exploration industry. Lifetime might have been a
problem in the past (currently several 1000 hours?).
Thermal neutrons have to be generated by slowing down (moderating) fast neutrons, as apparently there are
no portable means of producing them directly. This process can strongly reduce (by 2 to 3 orders of
magnitude) the effective neutron flux, i.e. with respect to what produced by the unmoderated source
[VIE99].
Some form of shielding is usually employed, both to screen the detector (from the direct neutrons) as well as
the environment and the operator. Nevertheless, in general a respectful distance has to be kept from the
source when outside its protective (shielding) case, or from the generator when in use – depending on
shielding, from several meters up to 10-20 m say! Note that for the most intense generators activation issues
have been reported, i.e. it was preferable to wait a few minutes before approaching again the object under
analysis.
The gamma ray detector is another key element of the system. According to the requirements its
complexity can range from a simple counting device (registering only the amount of gamma photons) to the
measurement of the energy (gamma spectroscopy, essential for chemical characterisation). When the
emphasis is on energy resolution – the single spectral lines have to be identified as precisely as possible – the
choice often falls onto a HPGe (High Purity Germanium) detector, which has an excellent energy resolution
(adjacent spectral lines can usually be very well separated). HPGe has unfortunately the following
disadvantages: it is very expensive, its efficiency decreases rapidly with increasing energy (and is in
particular very low at the 10.8 MeV nitrogen thermal capture line), and it has to be cooled to low
temperatures either cryogenically with liquid nitrogen or electromechanically. Speed might also be an issue.
There are therefore situations in which other detectors are preferred, such as BGO (Bismuth Germanate) or
NaI (sodium iodide) scintillators, which have a poorer energy resolution (individual spectral lines are
“washed out”, resulting in overlapping peaks) but can work very fast (high counting rates). These detectors
are also much more affordable and do not need cooling. Detector neutron damage might also have to be
considered depending on the operating parameters (some detectors are available in “hardened” versions).
The gamma ray spectrum itself can be quite complex, according to the target material and the operating
conditions (in particular for buried targets!). Amongst the factors influencing the signal of interest coming
from the target object – i.e. the number of γ-rays which are recorded – we schematically have the following:
 The number of incident neutrons, depending on the source strength and characteristics as well as
on the problem geometry (distance to target etc.), the attenuation/thermalisation on the way to the
target and within the target (e.g. UXO steel wall thickness, moderator details, presence of soil),
and the target properties;
 The cross section for the elements of interest (i.e. the probability of reaction, such as capture, and
of the decay of interest), their abundance in the target;
 The number of γ-rays which arrive back at the detector, again depending on the problem geometry
and attenuation on the way to the detector (e.g. UXO steel wall thickness, presence of soil);
 The detector efficiency (depends heavily on the detector type, its size, the γ-ray energy, the
counting rate);
 The efficiency of the data acquisition system.
Concerning the omnipresent background γ-ray spectrum (i.e. in addition to the signal of interest coming
from the target object), it is in part due to natural sources or neutron interactions in nearby materials or in the
equipment itself. Other factors will be considered further on.
Most systems need several minutes to reach sufficient statistics to make precise statements. Some elements
might be hard to detect due to neighbouring interference lines by other reactions (e.g. O, F, S), or because the
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energy of the emitted γ-ray is low (e.g. As at 280 keV) and therefore more attenuated passing through the
container’s walls (in particular steel in the case of UXO).
Software is undoubtedly one of the key issues, in particular in presence of complicated spectra as is often the
case when using fast neutrons for example, and might need extensive resources even if appropriate hardware
is available. According to the system and the task at hand different modes of operations can be envisaged,
ranging from the identification of single characteristic spectral lines (peaks) as good indicators for the
presence of key elements (chemical weapons for example), to more elaborate spectral deconvolution
solutions (extraction of individual peaks from a complicated spectrum).
Broadly speaking, we can define a few typical modes of operation, in increasing order of overall system
complexity:
 Level 1: detect one or more characteristic elements of the substance at hand (qualitative). This is
for example at the basis of TNA systems for the detection of explosives, which basically look for
the presence of nitrogen (and hydrogen). Similarly, TNA systems are also employed for the
analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) relying on the detection of (some of the) typical
key elements such as Arsenic (As), Bromine (Br), Chlorine (Cl), Fluorine (F), Phosphorus (P),
and Sulphur (S) (see Table 3).
 Level 2: detect more than one (ideally all) characteristic element, i.e. carbon, nitrogen and oxygen
(and hydrogen) for explosives, measuring their elemental ratios such as C/N or C/O
(semiquantitative), or even their elemental concentrations (quantitative). This could allow to
actually identify the substance under analysis. Whether this is really necessary depends obviously
on the operational requirements.
 Level 3: as Level 2 but in three dimensions, i.e. dividing the volume under analysis in voxels
(volume elements) and characterising each of them.
There is actually a Level 0 scenario which consists in “easier” indirect methods such as detecting hydrogen
and quantifying its amount. This can be done for example using simple neutron backscatter techniques (see
Annex A1.1), and has been employed as a quick method to differentiate chemical munition from ordinary
one (for well defined scenarios), or to detect explosive substances hidden behind doors, tyres, etc., in
counterterrorism applications. Similarly, a simple TNA system is also available for the assessment of
chemical warfare agents detecting only Chlorine (see Annex A1.3).
A list of parameters to be assessed in operational conditions could include the following:
 Software (end-user friendliness, robustness to unforeseen objects or geometries e.g. when using a
library);
 Security aspects (radiation hazard);
 Side effects on detection/false alarm rate (e.g. due to the soil);
 Minimal detectable mass;
 Effect of different inert substances (in the case of UXO) as well as of explosive mixtures;
 Effect of casing thickness (minimal detection mass increases);
 Detection rate vs. detection time;
 Possible activation of target object, and dependence on target object itself;
 Influence of particular elements on the γ-ray spectra and possibly on the false alarm rate, for
example because of neutron capture, or because of spectral lines competing with the ones of
interest (see also the comments in the TNA section).
Amongst the drawbacks of neutron based systems we find usually system complexity and cost, radiation
hazard, system weight (especially due to heavy shielding), power requirements. Depth of penetration also has
to be carefully assessed in case of buried objects, as well as the minimum amount of detectable explosive.
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Concerning the specific subject of humanitarian demining, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in Vienna has quite recently started a Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) on the Application of Nuclear
Techniques to Anti-Personnel Landmine Identification. More information is available from the Scientific
Secretary, Ulf Rosengard (email: ulf.rosengard@iaea.org, phone: + 43 1 2600 21753). The corresponding
reports such as [IAEA99, IAEA00] are a useful source of information on nuclear explosive detection
methods.
Table 4 summarises some of the nuclear reactions of interest for the detection/identification of explosives, to
which we are going to refer in the following.
Element Reactions Neutron Energy Reaction Type
H 1H(n,γ)2H Thermal Prompt
C 12C(n,n'γ)12C Fast (>5 MeV) Prompt
N 14N(n,γ)15N Thermal Prompt
N 14N(n,n'γ)14N Fast (>3 MeV) Prompt
N 14N(n,2n)13N Fast (14 MeV) Activation (9.9 min)
O 16O(n,n'γ)16O Fast (>7 MeV) Prompt
O 16O(n,p)16N Fast (>9 MeV) Activation (7.13 sec)
Cl 35Cl(n,γ)36Cl Thermal Prompt
Cl 35Cl(n,n'γ)35Cl Fast (>3 MeV) Prompt
Cl 35Cl(n,p)37S Fast (14 MeV) Activation (4.9 min)
Table 4: Nuclear reactions of interest for the detection/identification of explosives (source: [VAL99])
2.3.1. Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA):
Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) determines the composition of target substances by measuring the results
of the interaction of slow neutrons with matter (see also [BRO96]). At room temperature, these neutrons
have an average energy of about 0.025 eV (thermal neutrons). The capture of such low-energy neutrons by a
nucleus can result, as already discussed in §2.2, in the release of energy in the form of gamma radiation
(“neutron capture γ-rays”).
TNA relies on the explosives’ elevated nitrogen concentration for their detection, as most of them are
nitrated compounds whose nitrogen densities are above those of other materials. One interaction of particular
interest is indeed the capture of thermal neutrons on nitrogen, following the reaction 14N(nth,γ)15N. The result
of this interaction is the production, in about 18% of the cases, of characteristic 10.8 MeV γ-rays (the highest
γ-ray energy produced from a naturally occurring isotope):
14N + n (thermal) →  15N* →  15N + γ (10.8 MeV)
Nitrogen features also other spectral lines, but it is not clear if and how TNA systems exploit them at present.
Hydrogen and most metals (e.g. iron for steel cased UXO) are also easily detected. The capture process on
hydrogen produces deuterium (D or 2H) with the release of a characteristic 2.223 MeV γ-ray following the
reaction 1H(nth,γ)2H.
In summary, TNA is able to characterise High Explosives (HE) by their nitrogen and hydrogen signature,
possibly exploiting the absence of other elements as well. It is probably the “easiest” among the neutron-
based techniques, apart from neutron backscatter. On the other hand it is relatively slow; typical response
times range from minutes to tens of minutes, depending on the material being investigated. TNA it is not
capable of detecting, in practical terms, neither oxygen nor carbon.
In practice there are several obstacles to be overcome to apply TNA successfully for the detection of
explosives:
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 Background reduction, i.e. how to extract in a reliable way the pure nitrogen signal, which is, at
10.8 MeV, very characteristic but orders of magnitude weaker in intensity than the rest (the lower
part of the energy spectrum) [GOZ96].
 Possible Interference from other elements: chromium, chlorine and nickel γ-rays have been quoted
for certain applications [McF91], silicon (10.6 MeV line) if the object is buried (see also below).
Copper and alloys containing it (e.g. brass) have also been mentioned.
 Detector efficiency and/or energy resolution: very unfortunately HPGe is rather inefficient at
around 10 MeV. BGO detectors could have problems for this application due to a 10.2 MeV
“internal” line coming from the reaction 73Ge(n,γ) in the detector itself.
 Signal attenuation for buried objects, and small signal to noise ratio when analysing small masses.
For landmine detection for example the signal is influenced by burial depth, soil type and moisture
content, sensor stand-off, and obviously explosive content (and to a small degree explosive
distribution within the mine) [ANCxx1]. For buried objects in general the presence of boron or
other rare earth elements can greatly increase neutron attenuation (because of their very high
neutron capture cross section), thus reducing the depth at which the technique would work
[SPA98].
As already indicated in §2.3, thermal neutrons have to be generated by slowing down (moderating) fast
neutrons, as apparently there are no portable means of producing them directly. Concerning possible thermal
neutron sources, the D-T generator is far from optimal for (pure) TNA as the 14 MeV neutrons are difficult
to shield and produce quite some background. In addition, the moderation of 14 MeV neutrons to thermal
neutrons is apparently quite inefficient14. D-D generators, or a radioactive source such as 252Cf, seem
therefore to be more indicated if the aim is to generate a high number of neutrons in the thermal energy
region.
Prototype TNA systems are or have been built by companies and organisations such as ANCORE Corp.
(formerly SAIC Advanced Nucleonics until the end of 1997) [ANCxx1], Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC US, Santa Clara, CA) [SAI96, BOR00], SAIC Canada [McF98], the Italian INFN
(National Institute for Nuclear Physics) EXPLODET collaboration [VIE99], etc. These systems have been
mostly targeted at the detection of explosives for security applications, and also as confirmatory sensors for
the detection of buried landmines.
A prototype surface and near-surface UXO detector based on TNA has been developed and demonstrated
by SAIC [BOR00, ANCxx2, POR99]. It was composed of a Schiebel VAMIDS metal detector array and a
TNA sensor head mounted on a remote controlled vehicle, and was tested during the summer and fall of
1996, in Socorro, NM, and at the Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, respectively. During this second occasion the
system was fully integrated and capable of scanning, by remote control and with complete coverage, an area
of 50x50 m in six hours. The TNA sensor head had a weight of about 150 kg, used a 252Cf radioactive source,
and 8 NaI detectors in Socorro (5 minute measurement time) and 12 in Yuma (10 minute measurement time)
[POR98].
[BOR00] summarises the results of these tests (as well as of landmine detection tests carried out with similar
systems) as follows: “… large antitank mines and large ordnance items buried near the surface can be easily
detected with nuclear radiation techniques under realistic field conditions. Smaller mines and UXO items can
be detected under more ideal conditions.” It is also pointed out that this technique (as well as neutron
backscattering) is affected by soil conditions, nonhomogeneity, and burial depth. A detailed analysis of the
phenomena involved is carried out in [POR98, POR99, SPA98], including the effect on the signal to noise
ratio of the interfering 10.6 MeV capture γ-rays from 29Si (which is in fact reported as being the dominant
background source in the energy window of interest). The signal to noise ratio, reported to be of the order
unity for the tested system, can remain challenging even after background subtraction.
                                                     
14
 Ed Waller, University of New Brunswick, Private Comm., June 2000.
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TNA has been successfully applied to the characterization of chemical warfare agents – it is in particular
very sensitive to chlorine (see Annex A1.3) – by relying on the detection of characteristic elements, as
already mentioned. Some of them are in fact better detectable by exploiting fast neutron inelastic scattering,
for example phosphorus which has a thermal neutron capture reaction cross section a factor of 20 lower than
chlorine [CAF92b §3.1, DOE92 p. 36].
2.3.2. Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA):
The Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) technique measures the results of the interaction of fast neutrons with
suspect matter, in particular inelastic scattering (i.e. reactions of the (n,n'γ) type) and the production of
characteristics γ-rays as previously described. The neutron energy has therefore to be above a given threshold
for each of the elements involved (see Table 4), about 5 MeV for carbon (producing characteristic 4.43 MeV
γ-rays, with the corresponding energy peak apparently quite large15) and 7 MeV for oxygen (6.13, 3.84
MeV). Nitrogen can also produce intense high-energy γ-rays as a result of inelastic scattering with fast
neutrons (at 1.63, 2.3 and 5.1 MeV for example).
As already mentioned in §2.3, the energies of the γ-rays emitted indicate the elements present in the material.
The intensity of the γ-rays indicates the relative amount of material present. It is therefore in principle
possible to calculate the elemental ratios – how much of each element is present with respect to the others –
in order to determine the type of substance under analysis. In the instance of explosives, carbon, nitrogen,
and oxygen ratios are considered. Hydrogen (i.e. the proton) cannot be detected by pure FNA.
FNA has therefore the potential of delivering better results than TNA, because it is sensitive to nearly all
elements in explosives and opens the possibility of identifying the substance under analysis, but is usually far
more complex and expensive. The resulting γ-ray spectra can indeed be quite complex as numerous nuclear
levels are often excited, especially for 14 MeV neutrons hitting light elements, and even more in the case of
buried objects (background due to soil16).
2.3.3. Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA):
Pulsed operations allow the use of timing information (e.g. coincidence or anticoincidence measurements17),
and can be very useful for background reduction.
Pulsed operations are particularly interesting when using very short fast neutron pulses (typically
nanosecond wide, 10–9 sec) – short compared to the flight time across the object to be analysed. In addition,
the neutrons have to be as monoenergetic as possible (they have to travel at roughly the same speed). Given
these conditions, Time-Of-Flight (TOF) techniques can be used to determine the location of the detected
material: the measurement start time is given when the neutron pulse is created, and the stop time when the
γ-rays are recorded (the γ-rays travel at the speed of light, much faster than the neutrons). When combined
for example with the vertical scanning of the neutron source and the horizontal movement of the object
relative to the source/detector, pulsing provides a three-dimensional spatial resolution capability (still rather
coarse but potentially very useful). The nature of the material is again provided by gamma spectroscopy.
Up to now this technique has required rather large installations to produce a neutron beam of the required
characteristics (microsecond pulses have been routinely produced in commercial generators, but are
obviously much longer than what required for TOF techniques), combined with the need for fast electronics
and detectors. Work has been carried out in particular by the ANCORE Corp. (formerly SAIC Advanced
Nucleonics, http://www.ancore.com/).
NOTE: The speed v/c18 of a neutron of kinetic energy K, or actually of any particle, is equal to:
v2/c2 = 1 – m02/m2 = 1 – m02/(m0 + K/c2)2
                                                     
15
 This can make calculations of the corresponding elemental ratios more difficult.
16
 Standard soils contain for example on average 50% of oxygen (as mentioned in §1.2).
17
 Activating for example the γ-ray detectors during brief intervals according to the timing of the neutron source.
18
 Speed measured with respect to the speed of light c, with c = 3·108 m/s = 3·1010 cm/s = 30 cm/ns.
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where m0 is the particle rest mass (939.57 MeV/c2 for a neutron) and m = m0 + K/c2 is its relativistic total
mass. A neutron with a kinetic energy of 8 MeV, for example, would therefore have a total mass of 947.57
MeV/c2 (the c2 is in fact usually dropped), and therefore a speed of 0.13·c = 0.39·1010 cm/s = 3.9 cm/nsec, i.e.
13% of the speed of light.
2.3.4. Pulsed Fast-Thermal Neutron Analysis (PFTNA):
In a typical Pulsed Fast-Thermal Neutron Analysis (PFTNA) setup a neutron generator produces
microsecond wide fast neutron pulses, e.g. 14 MeV neutrons from a D-T generator. During these pulses, and
possibly also shortly thereafter, prompt γ-rays resulting from fast neutron inelastic scattering reactions (and
nuclear reactions) are measured, in particular to identify carbon and oxygen. The accelerator is then kept off
for a time of about 100 µsec, and during this interval the neutrons thermalise and prompt γ-rays resulting
from neutron capture reactions can be measured (in particular for the detection of nitrogen). The cycle then
starts again. A longer pause can also be exploited (a few msec), in order to measure delayed γ-rays due to
activation of one of the elements (such as oxygen).
The strength, as well as the weakness, of such a pulsed approach is that the signal to noise ratio improves,
but that the overall signal strength is reduced by the duty factor of pulsing, requiring much stronger peak
neutron intensity (to compensate for the low duty factor). This in turn can make the spectrum measurement
during the pulse very difficult [GOZ96].
2.3.5. Associated (Alpha) Particle – Time-of-Flight Neutron Analysis (API-TOF):
The Associated (alpha) Particle technique (or API, Associated Particle Imaging) uses an interesting
property of the deuterium-tritium (D-T) reaction previously described, namely that the source emits a lower
energy alpha particle simultaneously with, and at exactly at 180 degrees (“back-to-back”) to, each fast 14
MeV neutron produced. In a modified form of the D-T generator these alpha particles can be detected
internally with a position sensitive detector, measuring their time of generation (and therefore that of the
accompanying neutron) as well as their direction relative to the source (and therefore also the direction of
the accompanying neutron, since its line of travel is opposite to that of the alpha particle). The fast neutrons
thus produced are therefore also defined as “tagged” (by the associated particle), in time as well as in
direction, which can lead to a significant reduction in background signal. The Associated Particle Sealed
Tube Neutron Generators (APSTNG) Model A-910 and A-920 by MF Physics are examples of commercially
available devices (http://www.mfphysics.com/, maximum output of 109 n/sec).
The neutron then collides with a nucleus and produces a γ-ray, as previously described, whose time of arrival
at the detector can be precisely measured [NAV97]. This is therefore again a Time-of-Flight (TOF)
technique as described in the PFNA section, allowing to determine the distance travelled by the neutron (as
both the speed of the neutron and of the gamma are in principle known). As its direction is also known,
three-dimensional spatial resolution of targets can in principle be provided, without the need for scanning.
The nature of the volume element of material being analysed is again provided by gamma spectroscopy.
Associated Particle Imaging is therefore a technique which can potentially provide 3D information (i.e. voxel
by voxel) on the chemical nature of the object under analysis, ideally stoichiometric information (i.e.
determination of the quantitative chemical formula: CaNbOc for explosives, where a,b,c are atomic
proportions19).
Note that the neutron production rate might have to be kept low so that neutron interactions do not interfere
(need to limit random coincidences), depending on the detector and the electronics used; this would increase
measurement time. Some of the neutrons will also loose part of their energy in collisions and therefore not be
monochromatic any more, thus limiting system resolution. The need of having an extra detector built in the
neutron generator does also not make things easier. This technique is therefore far from easy to implement
outside of the lab. Research and development work has been or is ongoing for example at:
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 Argonne National Labs (http://www.techtransfer.anl.gov/techtour/lawenforce.html#Detection,
http://www.re.anl.gov/apstng.html; Brad Micklich <bjmicklich@anl.gov>, Alexander De Volpi
<adevolpi@anl.gov>) [SAL99].
 Consolidated Controls Corporation [MOL91, NAV97].
 “Atometer” collaboration at the DOE Special Technologies Lab in Santa Barbara, CA. Lead
member: HiEnergy Microdevices, Inc. (http://www.hienergymicrodevices.com/,
http://www.nv.doe.gov/business/capabilities/FieldableProto/AssocPartImg.htm; Bogdan Maglich
<maglich1@home.com>) [MAG00].
 The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna, Russia [BYS00].
2.3.6. Prompt Gamma Spectroscopy:
In a number of cases it is actually not necessary or appropriate to discriminate between TNA and FNA,
stressing instead that prompt γ-rays are measured, independently of them being due to thermal neutron
capture or fast neutron inelastic scattering. For example, in practice the neutrons used for TNA will also
contain a fast neutron component, and therefore γ-rays due to their inelastic scattering reactions will be
present in the spectrum together with the lines due to neutron capture (which is what one is looking for in
pure TNA). Pulsed operations allow some degree of discrimination (see for ex. §2.3.4).
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3. (Commercially Available) BULK Explosive Detection Systems:
A number of bulk explosive detection systems of potential interest for the task at hand, either
commercially available or at the advanced prototype phase, have been identified. They will be described in
the following pages, whereas Annex A1 will deal with other Explosive/Contraband detection technologies.
Where possible comments are given on the following key aspects:
 MATURITY (Market):
How long has the product been on the market (including manufacturer data if available).
 AVAILABILITY:
Off-the-shelf vs. (long) delay; special licence needed vs. general availability; local distributor vs.
remote distributor, etc.
 COMPLEXITY:
User education (training) level required; number of operators needed.
 MOBILITY:
How mobile is the system (weight, fragility, etc.).
 INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS:
Time needed for possible preparations; clarify mobility needs, set up necessary infrastructure;
need to meet legal regulations (e.g. radiation protection ordinance).
 OPERATIONAL READINESS:
How quickly is the system ready (to make a measurement) in case of an alarm.
 DETECTION LIMITS & TIMES:
E.g. grams, or ppm/ppb, and in which timeframe (“real time”, seconds, etc.).
 FALSE ALARMS (Rate):
 OTHER LIMITATIONS  / (PERSONAL) COMMENTS:
Note that comments are partly personal.
 PRICE.
What we actually tried to do is comment in more detail two systems, PINS and PELAN, without repeating in
detail all comments for the others, as many issues are similar (radiation hazard, cryogenics, etc.). Some
references are provided for the reader’s convenience, not all have been consulted. Arguments common to all
(or most) of the systems include the following:
 All systems employing radioactive sources will probably need a license to deal with them (and
perhaps also to transport them?).
 Need to use a large detector if relying on the 10.8 MeV nitrogen line (HPGe rather inefficient at
that energy).
 Systems will usually work best in reference situations (e.g. munition on a stand). Most of them
have not been designed to characterise partially buried munition.
 PRICE: It is rather difficult to get detailed price estimates, also bearing in mind that most systems
are (advanced) prototypes or one-off copies. In practice a price somewhere between 150 and 250
kCHF can be expected (say > 100 kUS$). The PRICE figure will therefore be mostly omitted in
the following.
 FALSE ALARMS: Nearly no direct indications have been found on this issue. Some comments
have already been provided in the sections describing TNA and FNA systems and their
derivatives.
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3.1. PINS – Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (INEEL/Perkin Elmer, ex EG&G
ORTEC):
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: TNA (+FNA), moderated 252Cf source (5 µg), HPGe detector.
According to official reports, the performance has been verified in the field in real-world situations by the
US Army, which has successfully identified hundreds of suspect munitions from burial sites and firing
ranges.
MATURITY:
Developed by EG&G ORTEC (now part of Perkin Elmer) and the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) at the beginning of the ’90s to determine in situ the specific nature of
an assortment of containers of munitions and chemical weapons.
AVAILABILITY:
There have apparently been licensing problems a few years ago (difficult to export outside US), which are
reported as having been solved. Delivery time quoted at 12 weeks.
COMPLEXITY:
Software seems to be reasonably user friendly. Moderate level of training/education probably required
(computer, cryogenics, radiation safety, γ-ray spectra).
Two operators for work on the mother dewar (attaching and detaching the detector, etc.).
MOBILITY:
Portable system, can be operated up to 8 hours on internal batteries. Can be transported for field use.
Shipped in 5 boxes with a total weight of 280 kg. HPGe detector must be filled with liquid nitrogen every
18 hours [unless electromechanically cooled version employed!].
INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS:
When detector not in use, it should be attached to a 30-liter “mother” dewar which continuously refills it
with liquid nitrogen (two-person team needed).
Detector must be used in a well-ventilated space (> 40 m3), because in case of accident the 1.2 l of liquid
nitrogen could expand to 800 l of gaseous nitrogen, displacing enough oxygen in a small room to cause
asphyxiation.
Source must be stored after use in approved shipping container at least 5 m away from common human
activity.
OPERATIONAL READINESS:
An uncooled detector requires at least 4 to 6 hours on the mother dewar before use. If the detector has
been used and is still cold when attached to the mother dewar, it requires only 5 to 10 minutes to refill.
The HPGe detector is also available in an electromechanically cooled version (50x50x50cm compressor,
needs mains connection or generator, at least in the version which was discussed; another version is
described in [PAR99]).
DETECTION LIMITS & TIMES:
Typical sampling times: 100 to 1000 sec. 2000 sec recommended for HE (155 mm projectile!).
System should be able to identify: Chemical weapons, including nerve agents GA, GB (sarin) and VX;
Blister agents HD, HN, HT (mustard gases), and Lewisite; High Explosives (HE) such as composition B,
RDX and TNT; military screening smokes such as titanium tetrachloride (FM) and White Phosphorous
(WP). Practice munition filled with water, concrete or sand.
PINS sensitivity is the highest for various smoke fills, followed by the CW agents that contain chlorine,
and then by CW agents that contain phosphorous. PINS is least sensitive to explosive-filled items (the
key element for their identification is N). Sensitivity is greater for large munitions as well as for thin-
walled items (e.g. mortar projectiles) [PAR99].
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tasks)
Page 24
FALSE ALARMS (Rate): TBD (TO BE DEFINED).
OTHER LIMITATIONS  / (PERSONAL) COMMENTS:
Primary aim: chemical munition. Detection of HE via detection of H and N. Sensitivity drops rapidly with
detector-target distance.
252Cf source can be used for two half-lives (5 years). About 3-5 m exclusion area around the source when
in use.
HPGe detector is fragile, has to be handled with care. Detector, source and shielding are usually mounted
on a stand for use. How to deal with munition in/on the ground (for the task at hand)?
Software: the relative peak heights (intensities), which are related to the ratios of the elements inside the
target (i.e. their concentrations), are apparently also taken in consideration for the final decision-tree
based evaluation (library of signatures?). Not clear which nitrogen lines are used.
NOTE: INEEL generally adapts the PINS software for new and unique situations (K. D. Watts, INEEL).
INEEL is also currently developing a “mini-PINS” and a neutron accelerator based PINS.
PRICE:
Electromechanically cooled HPGe (as option): +30 kDEM.
TESTING
See References.
REFERENCES:
[CAF92a] A. J. Caffrey, J. D. Cole, R. J. Gehrke, R. C. Greenwood, “Chemical warfare agent and high
explosive identification by spectroscopy of neutron-induced gamma rays”, IEEE Trans. On Nuclear
Science 39(5), pt. 1, pp. 1422-1426, Oct. 1992.
[CAF92b] A. J. Caffrey, J. D. Cole, R. J. Gehrke, R. C. Greenwood, K. W. Krebs, “Portable isotopic
neutron spectroscopy for nondestructive evaluation of CW”, in Chemical Weapons Verification,
Verification Technologies, Department of Energy/Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1st/2nd
Quarters 1992, DOE/DP/OAC/VT-92A (ref. [DOE92]), pp. 35-39.
[COL93] J. D. Cole, M. W. Drigert, R. Aryaeinejad, A. J. Caffrey, “Nuclear physics in arms control:
scenarios, techniques, and results”, in Intnl. Symposium on Nuclear Physics of our Times, pp. 322-337,
Sanibel Island, FL, Nov. 16-22, 1992. World Scientific, Singapore: 1993.
[CAF94] A.J. Caffrey, et al., “US Army Experience with the PINS Chemical Assay System”, INEL
report EGG-NRP-11443, Sept. 1994.
[PIN96] PINS Chemical Assay System, User’s Manual, Version 2.2, April 8, 1996, EG&G ORTEC.
[PAR99] W. E. Parker, W. M. Buckley, S. A. Kreek, A. J. Caffrey, G. J. Mauger, A. D. Lavietes,
“Portable system for nuclear, chemical agent, and explosives identification”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3769,
pp. 43-50, Denver, CO, July 19-23, 1999.
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3.2. PELAN – Pulsed Elemental Analysis with Neutrons (Vourvopoulos/WKU20,
NUMAT):
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: PFTNA, pulsed D-T generator (MF Physics), BGO detector, deconvolution soft.
Specifically targeted for the application at hand (differentiating inert UXO from HE filled one). Probe
setup – generator vs. detector position/orientation – is flexible.
MATURITY:
Different versions possible, systems starting to be commercialised. Some testing already done, some
details in the References.
AVAILABILITY: About 8 months, export licence included (see also Testing).
COMPLEXITY:
Automatic operation via palm-top, from a distance up to 100 m from the probe. PELAN does not
routinely display spectra to the operator.
MOBILITY:
Portable system, consisting of the Probe (20 kg, neutron generator head, BGO 3'' x 3'' detector, shielding),
Power and Data Module (20 kg, low and high voltage controls, computer), and the palm-top-based
Control. Special 10 kg platform provided, if required, for the PELAN-CW (chemical warfare) version.
Can be transported for field use.
INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS:
BGO detector does not necessitate cooling. Power requirements <100 W. System can operate from a
shoulder held power pack (not provided) for at least 8 hours, or from a 110V/220V AC source.
OPERATIONAL READINESS: Set-up time of less than 1 hour.
DETECTION LIMITS & TIMES:
Minimal mass: 100 grams of explosives (expected; depends on casing thickness). Typical sampling times:
300 sec (up to 14 min for CW). Inert materials mentioned in the UXO tests: wax-based filling, or red
epoxy filling.
FALSE ALARMS (Rate): TBD.
OTHER LIMITATIONS  / (PERSONAL) COMMENTS:
Safety distance: larger than 7 m from the Probe [VORxx] (emitted radiation at 15 m is actually below the
allowable radiation limits for general public). Neutron generator produces up to 1.6·108 n/s isotropically.
Relies on advanced spectral deconvolution software (broad BGO spectrum with respect to the HPGe
detector for example), based on a library of information; have apparently heavily invested in the software
development. If the investigation is of same-sized objects under standard geometry conditions, an
absolute calibration
 is possible, and the γ-ray counts correspond to a specific elemental concentration.
When (as an opposite case) objects under random conditions have to be analysed, if the elemental
contents cannot be uniquely determined from the number of counts of each element, elemental ratios such
as C/O (up to 10% accuracy), C/N, and C/H are used in a decision making tree. These ratios are reported
to allow the differentiation between explosives and innocuous materials, even when the explosives are
hidden among other objects (e.g. tools in a tool box, clothing articles, various liquids, etc.).
Residual activation of ordinary materials is reported as minimal since for a 300 s interrogation of an
object, neutrons are produced for only 10% of the time. Irradiation of foodstuffs can be calculated based
on recent guidelines from the World Health Organization.
Note that an estimation of the background spectrum might have to be acquired via a measurement taken
in the vicinity of the target, for example for objects lying on the ground. The C/O ratio is considered as
primary. It is not perfectly clear which spectral lines are used for the determination of the nitrogen
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 Western Kentucky University (see also the References).
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content, and how robust the system will be in unexpected situations (how much relying on library and
geometry? Coping with mixtures?).
PRICE: > 100 K$. Rights granted to a major corporation as from May 2001.
TESTING
The system was field tested in the USA with actual explosives (August 1999).  Further testing is planned
in Belgium and USA for chemical warfare agent identification (2001). See also the References.
REFERENCES:
“PELAN: Pulsed Elemental Analysis with Neutrons”, NUMAT, Inc. (brochure), 2000 (see NUMAT, Inc.
Website: http://www.numat.com/).
[DEP98] L. Dep, M. Belbot, G. Vourvopoulos, S. Sudar, “Pulsed neutron-based on-line coal analysis”, J.
of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol. 234, Nos 1-2 (1998), pp. 107-112.
[VORxx] G. Vourvopoulos, P. C. Womble, “Pulsed fast/thermal neutron analysis: A Technique for
Explosives Detection”. http://www.wku.edu/API/research/explo.htm
[VOR99a] G. Vourvopoulos, “Method and portable apparatus for the detection of substances by use of
neutron irradiation”, US Patent No. 5,982,838, Nov. 9, 1999.
[VOR99b] G. Vourvopoulos, P. C. Womble, J. Paschal, PELAN: A pulsed neutron portable probe for
UXO, IED and landmine identification, in Application of Nuclear Techniques to Anti-Personnel
Landmines Identification, Report of the First Research Co-ordination Meeting held 23-26 Nov. 1999
at the Rudjer Boškovic Institute in Zagreb, Croatia, IAEA publication IAEA/PS/RC-799.
Contact: Ulf.Rosengard@iaea.org.
[WOM99] P. C. Womble, G. Vourvopoulos, J. Paschal, P. A. Dokhale, “Multielement analysis utilizing
pulsed fast/thermal neutron analysis for contraband detection”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3769, pp. 189-195,
Denver, CO, July 19-23, 1999.
Western Kentucky University Web pages: http://www.wku.edu/API/research/public.htm
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3.3. NIGAS – Neutron Induced GAmma Spectrometer (Bruker Saxonia Analytik):
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: PFTNA, pulsed D-D generator, HPGe detector.
Targeted at Chemical Warfare Agents and Explosives, in particular via the identification of key chemical
elements (for CWA: Arsenic, Bromine, Chlorine, Fluorine, Phosphorus, and Sulphur).
Similar in concept to PINS, replacing the radioactive source with a (unmoderated) D-D generator: about
107 n/s (2.5 MeV), pulse length 20 µsec, pulse frequency 10 kHz. Max (overall) power consumption
(when applying a liquid nitrogen cooled detector?): 800 W.
Same comments as PINS concerning use of HPGe detector (will not be repeated).
MATURITY (Market):
Starting to market the system for specific applications (esp. CWA).
AVAILABILITY: TBD
COMPLEXITY: User friendly software to identify single elements exists.
MOBILITY:
TBD. For the task at hand power requirements need to be carefully assessed. A jeep is necessary for
transportation.
(system portability might be an issue for the task at hand).
INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS: TBD
OPERATIONAL READINESS: TBD
DETECTION LIMITS & TIMES:
Typical sampling times: 300 sec (for CW). Probably much longer if the detection of nitrogen is required.
FALSE ALARMS (Rate): TBD.
OTHER LIMITATIONS  / (PERSONAL) COMMENTS:
Primary aim: chemical munition.
IN pulse detection of P, S, As, F (prompt gamma due to inelastic scattering), OFF pulse detection of Cl,
H, N (prompt neutron capture gamma). High detection efficiency due to the reduction of the interference
between neutron capture and inelasting scattering reactions has been reported.
Are using D-D after initial experience with D-T (too high energy, D-D makes detection of the key
elements just mentioned much easier). Accelerator developed in collaboration with a Russian company.
Safety distance: 15 m from generator if no screening present, otherwise (with screening) about 2-3 m.
Negligible activation of target object. Generator does not contain tritium.
Bruker has been clear about the non-optimal detection of nitrogen (the system cannot detect carbon nor
oxygen, like PINS), i.e. long measuring times, in the standard configuration. Improvements/modifications
of the system towards the detection of explosives are therefore under way. A special detector for the
detection of nitrogen is being tested. In combination with the pulsed working regime of the generator (low
background at the nitrogen gamma energy) good results for the detection of explosives are thus obtained.
Bruker suggested the possibility of trying to identify the inert filler instead of the explosive (when the
possible fillers are known a priori), e.g. concrete from the characteristic Al and Si lines.
PRICE: TBD.
Likely to be quite high (with respect to PINS), according to the manufacturer due to the higher use value
(e.g. D-D neutron generator). Transportation and storing costs are low because the neutron generator does
not contain radioactive substances.
TESTING:
Real tests carried out with a number of chemical munitions (75 mm WWI shells), in collaboration with
Tauber Spezialtiefbau GmbH (German EOD company), with positive results (see Refs.).
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REFERENCES:
 “NIGAS: The Neutron Induced Gamma Spectrometer”, Bruker Saxonia Analytik GmbH (brochure), 2000
(?).
 “Zerstörungsfreie Identifikation von chemischen Kampfstoffen mit dem Analysensystem NIGAS” (Non-
destructive Identification of CWA with the NIGAS Analysis System), Bruker Saxonia Analytik
GmbH (report), 2000 (?), in German.
Web: http://www.bruker-daltonik.de/, http://www.bruker-daltonik.de/company/ds_m.html, sales@bsax.de.
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3.4. NIPPS – Neutron Induced Prompt Photon Spectroscopy (WIS/Hazard Control):
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: TNA + FNA, 3Ci AmBe source (8.1·106 n/s = 111 GBq; also accelerator),
HPGe detector.
Targeted at Chemical Warfare Agents in particular. Developed by WIS (German Armed Forces Institute
for Protection Technologies, Munster, Germany).
Similar in concept to PINS, using an AmBe source and somewhat refined electronics (dual ADC
converters for high/low gain etc.). Developed own software.
Same comments as PINS concerning use of HPGe detector (will not be repeated).
MATURITY:
…
AVAILABILITY:
Interesting system, which WIS does not sell; it has granted rights to a small company (Hazard Control).
The latter made it in fact clear that A) the system still has to be ruggedised for field use, B) there is no
market for individual units.
COMPLEXITY:
Software seems to be reasonably user friendly. Moderate level of training/education (computer,
cryogenics, radiation safety, γ-ray spectra) probably required.
MOBILITY:
All parts and transportation boxes portable by 2 persons.
INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS:
Source must be stored after use in approved shipping container...
OPERATIONAL READINESS: Set up time of less than 1 hour (if detector already operative).
DETECTION LIMITS & TIMES:
Typical sampling times: 1 to 30 min, depending strongly on the amount of agent present and the steel
wall thickness of the container. About 10 min for a 155 mm shell.
No problem to detect H, Cl and As; for the other elements (P, S, F21), the detection sensitivity is lower
and/or the detection is complicated by interfering gamma lines from other reactions. The system is able to
identify to some extent, with longer detection times, also C and O
 (the neutrons produced by the AmBe
source have a higher average energy than those from 252Cf) and N.
FALSE ALARMS (Rate): TBD.
OTHER LIMITATIONS  / (PERSONAL) COMMENTS:
Primary aim: chemical munition. Collaboration with OPCW inspectors. HE not widely tested, nor
(partially) buried objects. Possible minimal explosive detectable mass of 1 kg (depends on steel casing
thickness and geometry)?
The volume analysed by the system is estimated to be about a half-sphere of 10 cm radius centred around
the detector surface.
WIS suggested the possibility of using only BGO or NaI if the aim is only to detect nitrogen (more
efficient at higher energies).
PRICE: TBD.
TESTING
The DGA/DCE/CEB (Centre d’Études du Bouchet of the Délégation Générale à l’Armement, the French
Defence Procurement Agency) has a NIPPS system available, which has been tested with positive results
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 One of the advantages of NIPPS is the detection of fluorine, which is not easy in particular when using Californium based
systems.
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[VET98] on WWI projectiles (1997). The latter are characterised by a lot of different geometries and
compositions. The analysis of WWI munition is indeed not a simple task (wide number of configurations,
several hundred different types, much testing was done at the time).
Note that explosives were usually identified by the absence of P or Cl rather than by nitrogen detection
(but “only” a 30% efficiency HPGe detector was used). Results do quite depend on the casing thickness.
REFERENCES:
[BUC96] F.-W. Buchholz, L. Schänzler, G. Tumbrägel, “Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) of Chemical
Weapons: NIPPS”, German Armed Forces Institute for Protection Technologies – NBC-Protection
(WIS-ABC), Munster, Germany, Sept. 1996.
[VET98] F. Vettese, B. Asselineau, C. Pienne, F.-W. Buchholz, L. Schänzler, G. Tumbrägel, “Old
Munition Identification by Neutron Interrogation Assessment of the German NIPPS System”, in Proc.
6th International Symposium on Protection Against C & BW Agents, Stockholm, 1998.
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3.5. GIOS – Gerät zur Identifizierung Organischer Substanzen22 (I.U.T.):
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: TNA +FNA or PFTNA, AmBe or pulsed D-T, HPGe or (larger) NaI detector.
Conceived as a modular system, with D-T generator or AmBe source, HPGe or NaI detector, different
types of shielding, according to the exact needs.
Uses the portable (gamma) spectrometer NOMAD PLUS by EG&G ORTEC (now Perkin Elmer).
Same comments as PINS concerning use of HPGe detector (will not be repeated).
MATURITY:
A real commercial version does not exist yet. Part of the software would have probably to be modified or
specifically written for the task at hand (the currently used software is a standard package from EG&G for
the analysis of γ-ray spectra).
DETECTION LIMITS & TIMES:
Standard measurement time of 400 sec with D-T generator, but really depends on application.
OTHER LIMITATIONS  / (PERSONAL) COMMENTS:
Safety distance: 10-20 m when generator in use, which probably produces up to 108 n/s, 12 Hz pulse
repetition frequency, 1.5 µsec pulse length (very intense pulses). Wait 10-15 min after the end of the
measurement (activation of metallic objects!). AmBe radioactive source more indicated when thermal
neutrons are required.
PRICE: TBD.
TESTING
I.U.T. has definitely practical experience in the analysis of munition and the discrimination of chemical
vs. High Explosive (HE) vs. inert munition, looking at a number of different parameters. The system was
however operated by a specialist
 (i.e. I.U.T. provided a service to Koch Munitionsbergungsgesellschaft
mbH, a German EOD company). Some of the parameters which were looked at included the H/O vs. Si/O
ratio (the inert shells were either empty, or contained concrete or silica sand), the oxygen peaks with
respect to each others as well as their importance in the overall spectrum, etc. C/O, C/N ratios not
considered up to now.
Other applications included the need to determine if a given substance was present or not in the object
under analysis.
REFERENCES:
“GIOS: Gerät zur Identifizierung Organischer Substanzen”, I.U.T. (Institut für Umwelttechnologien) GmbH
(brochure). http://www.iut-berlin.de/
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3.6. NICEB – Neutron Interrogation by the Centre d’Études du Bouchet
(DGA23/DCE/CEB):
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: PFTNA, pulsed D-T generator (SODERN), HPGe detector.
Targeted at Chemical Warfare Agents, in particular old WWI munition.
Similar in concept to the previously mentioned systems (e.g. GIOS), using a SODERN GENIE 16 pulsed
D-T generator as source (2·107 n/s), and a “modified” NIPPS detection system.
Same comments as PINS concerning use of HPGe detector24 (will not be repeated).
DETECTION LIMITS & TIMES:
Typical sampling times: 10 min.
OTHER LIMITATIONS  / (PERSONAL) COMMENTS:
Primary aim: chemical munition.
The volume analysed by the system is estimated to be about a half-sphere of 10 cm radius centred around
the detector surface.
DGA does not sell/market the system itself. In the best case it can sell the technical specifications
(how to assemble it).
The detection of prompt γ-rays due to the impinging fast neutrons is carried out during the pulse, i.e. in
coincidence with it, and is partially perturbed by the pulse itself (the detector is partially “blinded” during
the neutron pulse). The detection of capture γ-rays, carried out in anticoincidence with the neutron pulse,
profits on the other hand from a reduced noise level and features therefore a sensitivity higher than the
one offered by radioactive source based systems25.
TESTING
System was tested by DGA/DCE (1998-99) on 50 WWI projectiles of different calibre, contents and
origin (large variations are characteristic of WWI munition) with positive results [VET99]. A previous
test on simulated 75 mm French projectiles (8 mm thickness) resulted in N and Sn being difficult to
detect, and C quite impossible (all other elements of interest were easily identified), within the 10 minute
measurement time.
Conventional High Explosives munition has been identified by an excess of oxygen combined with the
absence of key CWA elements. Direct identification using nitrogen detection, characteristic of HE, has
been possible only in a few cases.
The electronics could be improved (made faster), the software too.
REFERENCES:
[VET99] F. Vettese, P. Bourgeault, P. Bouteilloux, “Old Munition Identification by Neutron Interrogation
– The French NICEB System”, in Proc. International CW Demil Conference (CWD99), Vienna,
Austria, 7-9 June 1999.
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 Délégation Générale à l’Armement, the French Defence Procurement Agency.
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 Apart from the fact that an autonomy of 5 days has been chosen for this system (the autonomy of the cooled HPGe detector does
in fact depend on its cryostat’s volume).
25
 F. Vettese, DGA/DCE/CEB, Private Comm., Dec. 2000.
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tasks)
Page 33
3.7. PNCAS – Pulse Neutron Chemical Analysis Sensor (EPPRA):
EPPRA is a spin-off of the École Polytechnique (Palaiseau, France) specialising in the development and
supply of technology products to OEMs based on pulsed power and high energy plasmas. EPPRA has
developed a novel technique for the detection of concealed explosives and is currently engaging in two EC
projects relating to airport security and landmine detection (for humanitarian demining tasks). The
tomographic interrogation by neutron activation technique promoted by EPPRA can be used to identify and
remotely (non contact) locate the chemical composition of a buried object in situ. Basically, the aim is to tell
which type of substance is buried where (with some approximation). Key to the system are a dedicated
source (very short pulse plasma neutron generator) and a dedicated detector (large area very fast gamma
detector).
The Neutron Source consists of a compact pulsed and ultra fast plasma neutron source. It is able to generate
108 high-energy neutrons (energy greater than 8 MeV) per 10 nanosecond pulse (pulses are very short!). The
source is non-radioactive when switched off and has a low power requirement, less than 150 W. Time-of-
Flight Analysis (TOF) is therefore also possible: it consists in measuring the time interval between two
events, and therefore the particle’s range – how far the particle has travelled – knowing its speed26.
Measurement of the outgoing γ-rays is carried out by a set of special purpose, low cost large area gamma
detectors, with a very fast response time, less than 2 nsec. Measurements are concurrently possible over
several different spectral channels (energy bands), and efficiency limiting pile up effects, due to two or more
particles arriving too close in time, have been resolved by operating the detectors in current mode, instead of
the traditional method of pulse counting.
In the end it is possible to obtain a distinct signature which characterises the elemental proportions – how
much of each element (C, H, N, O) is present with respect to the others – in order to determine the substance
type. This is implemented using novel data processing algorithms capable of extracting an explosive’s
features with only a few detection channels.
Locating the substance’s position (in case of a buried object) should also be possible using triangulation
methods, that is by knowing an estimate of the substance’s distance along a direction and looking at the
ground from several different directions. 
[Source: EUDEM trip report, March 1999, Unpublished; revised Dec. 2000]
Laboratory tests are foreseen for the end of 2000, with a prototype ready at the beginning of 2001.
Web: http://www.eppra.com/
3.8. SODERN:
SODERN, France, has in fact all the necessary hardware to set up a system: D-T or D-D generators (one of
the main manufacturers, with the basic unit – GENIE 16 – priced starting from around 360 kFF), detectors,
high-speed electronics. The necessary software represents the crucial point, as it is usually developed only
for specific applications having a real market potential (e.g. online cement analysis). A system could be set
up for testing, but might have to be operated by a specialist.
Concerning similar applications, they have furnished D-T generators to INEEL (for PINS), the DGA for the
analysis of chemical weapons (see the description of the NICEB system), and the French police.
Web: http://www.sodern.fr/SODERN/neutronicsa.htm
3.9. Other Prototypal Systems:
SAIC (US) has developmental programs [BOR00] which should result in commercial products in a few
years’ time. Their PIEDS system is similar to PELAN in concept and has been described in [HOL00].
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The potentialities of the “Atometer” API-TOF system by Maglich and colleagues [MAG00] are also
acknowledged (see also §2.3.5); the system is however still is in a development phase.
The use of a time-tagged radioactive source represents also an interesting development: a time trigger is
provided when neutrons are emitted, which in laboratory tests allowed to reduce the background signal and
enhanced the overall performance of a neutron backscatter system for landmine detection [CRA00].
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3.10. Some Conclusions on BULK Explosive Detection Systems:
A few general comments can be made on the bulk explosive detection systems described in this chapter:
 All systems of interest revolve around some form of gamma spectroscopy, with different
combinations of the neutron source, detector, electronics and software, often employing standard
options (e.g. 252Cf radioactive source or D-T neutron generator, etc.). HPGe detectors have been
used in the field but are somewhat fragile and need to be cooled (liquid nitrogen or
electromechanically). All parts are important for a successful exploitation, including the software
whose importance cannot be sufficiently stressed.
 The task at hand is rather specific and the corresponding market therefore rather small (at least up
to now). Most systems have probably not been sold up to now (or in case as one-off copies tailored
for specific tasks)!
 PELAN seems to be one of the few systems specifically designed to characterise HE UXO. All
other systems have as primary aim the identification of chemical munition – a task where they
seem to be working well, at least for verification purposes (e.g. checking stocks for compliance
with international treaties) or when large quantities have to be destroyed (large installations) – or
are not really portable.
 The systems are not likely to have been tested on partially buried objects.
 Most systems are likely to have problems for smaller pieces of munition. Measurement times of
several minutes have to be envisaged.
 The EPPRA PNCAS system (see §3.7) has the potential of being in a class of its own whenever it
will reach sufficient maturity. Systems based on API-TOF look also interesting on paper.
Basically, the following two approaches look possible27 in the short term for EOD tasks:
 Detect explosives using a TNA system, i.e. look solely for nitrogen (and in particular the 10.8
MeV line) and hydrogen. This approach does in general preclude the possibility of identifying the
explosive, unless some form of standard setup, and therefore calibration, is possible.
In this case a system such as PINS (Perkin Elmer) could be considered, probably with a large
HPGe detector and a moderated californium source (the latter does anyhow probably represent the
default). An alternative could be represented by NIGAS (Bruker), in which the presence of a D-D
generator offers an interesting approach, perhaps with additional moderator material to increase
the thermal neutron yield.
Improvements/modifications of the system towards the detection of nitrogen could also be
envisaged, at hardware as well as at software level (use of a more efficient detector for example,
e.g. larger HPGe or even NaI/BGO28, adaptation of current software, improved measurement
setup). Note that in the case of PINS the possibility of adapting the existing software “for new and
unique situations” has been explicitly mentioned by K. Watts, INEEL.
 Detect other explosive constituents, ideally all (C, N, O and H), using a (pulsed) neutron
generator to produce fast neutrons. Sensitivity to nitrogen could on the other hand be reduced.
Most systems use D-T generators: PELAN (Vourvopoulos/WKU, NUMAT; BGO detector),
NICEB (DGA/DCE; HPGe detector) or GIOS (I.U.T.; HPGe or NaI detector) which are
unfortunately not available off-the-shelf.
An alternative is represented by the NIPPS system (WIS/Hazard Control) that employs an AmBe
radioactive source (but the detection of oxygen is probably not easy given the energy spectrum).
Radiation hazard is obviously also present and will have to be dealt with.
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 Lower energy resolution but higher efficiency at high energy.
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tasks)
Page 36
4. TRACE Explosive Detection Technologies:
Trace explosive detection consists in the chemical identification of microscopic residues of the explosive
compound, either in vapour or in particulate form (or both), whereby:
 Vapour refers to the gas-phase molecules emitted from the explosive’s surface (solid or liquid)
because of its finite vapour pressure, and
 Particulate refers to microscopic particles of solid material that adhere (contaminate) to surfaces
that have, directly or indirectly, come into contact with an explosive material (see also §1.1.3).
A sample has therefore to be acquired and transported into the analytical device29 (contrary to bulk detection
in particular). Trace particle detection can potentially detect picogram-level samples of explosive material/
ppt concentrations [NAV97, NAV9x]. Even lower sensitivities are certainly achievable, but whether for field
systems remains to be seen. Note that the need for a field system does actually depend on the application: in
at least one case, the Mechem MEDDS (Mechem Explosive and Drug Detection System, see §4.2.2), the
sample is brought to the detector – dogs in this case! – for analysis. A list of different trace technologies and
their acronyms is provided in Table 5. They are discussed in more detail in Annex A3.
Acronym Detector Type
Colour Colour Change of Test Paper
ECD Electron Capture Detector
FIS Field Ion Spectrometer
GC/CL Gas Chromatograph / ChemiLuminescence
GC/ECD Gas Chromatograph / Electron Capture Detector
GC/IMS Gas Chromatograph / Ion Mobility Spectrometer
GC/MS Gas Chromatograph / Mass Spectrometer
GC/SAW Gas Chromatograph / Surface Acoustic Wave
IMS Ion Mobility Spectrometer
ITMS® Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer (pat. Ion Track
Instruments)
TR Thermo-Redox
Table 5: Trace explosive detection technologies and their acronyms (source: [NIJ99a], Table 3)
4.1. Sampling:
With most commercial trace explosives detection systems, there are two common means of collecting
samples: swipe (or particle, or particulate) collection and vapour collection. Some comments on particle
collection have already been provided in §1.1.3. Other sources of information are [NIJ99b, NIJ99a, NAP99
Ch. 7]. Comments on sampling and preconcentration techniques are also provided in [YIN99, §2.3, McF80,
McF91].
In swipe collection, a sampling pad (usually supplied by the manufacturer), usually paper or cloth [NIJ98], is
wiped across a surface suspected of having residue of explosive material; direct contact is therefore required.
This surface could be a tabletop, the outside of a package, a piece of luggage, clothing, and so forth. The
sampling pad is then inserted into a sampling port on the instrument for thermal desorption and subsequent
analysis. Particle detection is also discussed in some detail in [NAV9x, YIN99].
In contrast, vapour collection involves the use of a small hand-held vacuum cleaner to collect airborne
vapours or particles. Typically, vacuuming is performed just above the surface to be investigated. A
collection filter (or a pre-concentrator) is located inside the inlet of the vacuum, and air is drawn through this
filter. The explosive material (actually in the form of either vapour or particles, see also [NAV9x]) will be
trapped on the filter. The filter is then removed and analysed by the system in a manner similar to the
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surface is analysed in situ with infrared light [NAV9x].
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analysis of a swipe sample. Vapour sampling of this sort is generally less sensitive than swipe sampling, but
is for example advantageous for screening people because it is not necessary to touch the person being
screened (taking samples with vapour collection is regarded as less invasive than collecting swipe samples).
Sample acquisition is identified in [NAV97, NAV9x] as the primary weakness of current trace detection
systems, rather than detector sensitivity, for the applications therein discussed30. See also [ROU97b]. An
interesting discussion and critical analysis of vapour vs. particle explosive detection is also carried out in the
[NAV9x] report.
Note that all trace gas detectors can be used with preconcentrators, which essentially act as gain amplifiers
[McF91]. Their efficiency is somewhat constrained for practical applications by the need to keep a
reasonable measuring time, in particular in the case of real-time systems. On the same topic see also [YIN99,
McF80].
4.2. UXO/Landmine Characterization or Detection:
Trace explosive detection technologies and the corresponding commercially available systems are rather
mature, but mostly aimed at security (law enforcement) applications. We will consider them separately in
more detail in Annex A3, and turn now our attention to the problem of UXO characterization or detection.
The following general questions seem relevant in this context:
 Particle detection: explosive particle contamination of the UXO surface might be possible, for
example due to the production process, to storage or handling (similarly to what has been reported
for landmines), or to firing of shells in the UXO’s neighbourhood. At which level?
Note that the possibility of cross-contamination with other explosives cannot be excluded. An
inert object could therefore still give a positive reading. The practical feasibility of collecting
surface contamination is another important issue, e.g. when the UXO should not be touched.
 Vapour detection: Explosive vapours might leak from the UXO (e.g. through the fuse assembly?),
especially from older munition likely to show signs of corrosion, or when the casing is broken. At
which level?
 In the case of (partially) buried UXO, which would be level of soil explosive contamination?
Would it make sense to analyse soil samples in the UXO’s proximity (probably less likely to work
in contaminated areas)?
 Can these parameters, which are a function – as is typical in trace explosive detection – of a large
number of variables such as environmental parameters, the UXO’s “history”, etc., be translated
into operationally useful parameters?
The detection of other substances, such as explosive degradation products or signature compounds (e.g.
cyclohexanone, a solvent, associated to C-4), could also be considered.
Trace detection of UXO seems to be possible, at least in some circumstances, as application of dogs would
seem to testify (for example during demining operations), so that the same might be true for their
characterization (inert or not). However, we can anticipate that there does not seem to be a lot of material
available on this subject, let alone a commercial system. We will therefore turn our attention to work in
similar fields (e.g. landmine detection), as well as to some R&D work concerning more specifically the UXO
problem.
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4.2.1. Estimates and Ongoing Studies in Related Fields:
Concerning the detection of buried artillery rounds, [McF80] estimates that, unlike mines, they are
essentially hermetically sealed units having such high attenuation factors as to preclude detection by trace
gas means.
Studies and measurements on environmental fate and transport of explosives are carried out mostly in
relationship with landmine detection, for example at the Sandia National Labs, CRREL (USACE Engineer
Research and Development Center, Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory), FOA (Swedish
Defence Research Establishment), DRES (Defence Research Establishment Suffield, Canada) and probably
others. MECHEM (South Africa) has also quite some experience on the subject.
This work tells us that in the case of landmines some explosive vapour emission is indeed likely to occur
gradually from leaks in the casing or through seals and seams, and/or from evaporation of the residual
explosive found on the surface of the casing [DES98]. The soil could also be contaminated with trace
quantities of explosives during the burial process (but this looks less likely to be applicable to the scenario
we are considering).
Detailed results of modelling activity are for example described in [PHE98, GEO99, WEB99]. It is
particularly interesting that explosive compounds such as TNT, DNT and RDX will have (for the given
assumptions) over 90% of the mass fraction adsorbed to the soil solid phase, up to 10% present in the soil
aqueous phase, and less than 10–6 in the soil vapour phase. The effect of parameters such as burial depth,
how long the mine has been buried (time lag), biochemical half-life of explosives31, location and climatic
conditions, uptake by plant roots, soil moisture, etc., have also started to be addressed.
The importance of 2,4-DNT and 1,3-DNB vapours (explosive related chemicals) for the detection of
landmines has also been stressed, as they can be majoritary with respect to (2,4,6-)TNT [GEO99]. Some
authors estimate the concentration of TNT in air over a landmine as being a factor 103-106 below the
equilibrium vapour concentration, which would mean ppt (part per trillion, 1:10–12) to ppq (parts per
quadrillion, 1:10–15) sensitivity necessary to detect TNT in the vapour phase (!).
Providing realistic figures for explosive vapour concentrations is indeed not easy, as the vapour losses are
difficult to estimate. For comparison, in the case of IEDs [McF91] quotes a “crude” upper limit of 1 ng/m3
(m3, not cm3!) for the minimum sensitivity necessary to detect TNT (which would be about a factor 105
lower than what expected from the vapour pressure alone, corresponding to 0.1 ppt). The most sensitive
technique quoted in the same report was atmospheric source mass spectrometry, in particular APCI MS
(Atmospheric Pressure Chemical Ionization Mass Spectrometry). It was deemed sufficiently sensitive even
without the use of preconcentrators, whereas atmospheric source tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS) was
deemed marginally feasible without preconcentrators and feasible with one, and IMS was deemed feasible
with a preconcentrator. All estimations were based on the previously quoted limit. A number of other studies
have been certainly carried out since.
Sample acquisition is again a key issue. Improved sampling devices have been proposed [YIN99], for
example in [FIS98] for particles, in [CHR99, GEH99, GEI99] for vapours. Building soil probes to extract the
explosive compounds adsorbed on soil particles and/or dissolved in the soil water is also an attractive option,
if operationally feasible.
In 1997 the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) started a 3-year technology
development program to detect mines via their chemical signature (“Dog’s Nose Program”). The results of
these extensive efforts are detailed at http://www.darpa.mil/ato/programs/uxo/.
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4.2.2. Practical Applications:
Dogs are being used in humanitarian demining for the detection of landmines as well as UXO (depending on
which type they have been trained on, probably mostly surface items or shallowly buried ones), see for
example [HOR98], also for a description of the Mechem MEDDS (paper #6), and [LJU99]. Detection of
UXO only has also been reported. Within MEDDS one actually distinguishes between so-called “chemical
dogs”, which are trained to smell pure chemicals such as TNT or RDX, and “bouquet dogs”, which are
trained to recognise composite smells (e.g. from a given plastic mine) in which the explosive might not
necessarily be dominant (the plastic or rubber component of a landmine or metal of an UXO might be). In
this last case landmine/UXO detection is therefore not necessarily synonymous with explosive detection.
The Sandia National Labs have carried out work with the objective of developing a field portable
chemical sensing system to examine mine-like objects and UXO in near-real time. Field tests have
included unearthed mortar rounds and artillery shells, and AP/AT mines on land [ROD00]. One sampling
system was designed for soil vapour sampling, another for sampling exposed munitions, the latter consisting
of a battery-powered pump and a short quartz tube; the explosive is then thermally desorbed into an Ion
Mobility Spectrometer. The chemical sensing systems are capable of sub-ppb detection of TNT and related
explosive compounds.
UXO exposed to the environment was analysed to determine whether they were inert or contained
explosives (July 1998, Cape Cod, MA): a total of 1112 projectiles, including 60 mm mortars, 81 mm
mortars, and 105 mm artillery shells were analysed, along with 151 pieces of scrap ordnance, partial fuses
and other items. The UXO showed a significant amount of corrosion. The samples were collected along
seams, joints, and where breaches in the case could be observed. As most shells were expected to be inert,
they were analysed in groups of 25, with a sampling time of 125 seconds per group. If a signal was observed,
the shells in the corresponding grouping would be re-analysed individually. All 1263 items were sampled in
three days.
Every shell was cut open to verify the contents. Overall the vast majority were found to be inert. The vapour
analysis did not produce any false positives (i.e. false alarms), but two false negatives (two intact 105 mm
shells which were found to be live and for which no IMS signal was registered, for unknown reasons).
Additionally, ten 105 mm shells believed to contain explosives were analysed at Sandia. All produced
detectable signals and were correctly identified. For details on the landmine field tests see also [CHA99].
They allowed to prove the ability to detect explosive molecules in soil samples in the vicinity of buried land
mines.
INEEL (Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory)32 has carried out tests on new
munitions at Dugway Proving Grounds to determine if explosive vapours could be detected outside them.
Explosives were not detected using IMS technology. INEEL continues to develop methods to sense very low
levels of explosive vapour near munitions.
[INEEL is also developing a mobile Secondary Ion Mass Spectroscopy (SIMS) system for the detection of
trace chemicals on surfaces, with a system being currently deployed on an Army’s system and undergoing
evaluation. Laboratory based SIMS systems are currently used at INEEL to detect very low levels of
chemicals on surfaces. Explosives are more difficult to detect than chemical warfare agents. SIMS has been
tested at the Army’s facilities at Dugway Proving Grounds. SIMS can be optimised for explosives detection.]
                                                     
32
 Kenneth D. Watts, INEEL, Private Comm., June 2000.
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tasks)
Page 40
5. Conclusions:
We recall that the main goal of this study was to characterise existing technologies, and identify
corresponding commercially available systems, for the direct detection of explosives for Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) tasks. Systems should be able to determine if a given piece of munition, which has already
been detected by other means, contains explosives or is inert, and ideally in the former case to establish the
type of explosive. It was in fact agreed to keep the target application and audience somewhat larger at the
beginning of the study (see the Introduction). As a result, explosive detection systems which are not
necessarily directly applicable to EOD tasks have also been studied and described, mostly in the Annex.
We can summarise our findings as follows:
 Bulk explosive detection: the quantity of explosive is rather well known for UXO (say above 100
grams), partly also in the case of IEDs (e.g. airport security). The range of explosives is not
necessarily the same for UXO and IEDs.
Systems capable of direct bulk explosive detection33 seem to still have quite a way to go, apart
from advanced X-ray based systems used for screening luggage, packages, mail, etc., most of
which are not easily portable, and possibly some Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) sensors (level
of diffusion unclear, see also Annex A2.2).
UXO: Systems exploiting low frequency electromagnetic fields (NMR, NQR) are probably
useless for the characterization of UXO due to shielding. This leaves at present only systems
using neutron sources and relying on gamma spectroscopy as potential candidates (see also
the corresponding Conclusions in §3.10, which will not be repeated in detail). Unfortunately
most of such systems have been designed for other tasks, such as the discrimination of
chemical weapons.
Nearly no such system is as yet really available off-the-shelf, perhaps apart from PINS, and
capable of working under all the assumptions listed in the Introduction. It should
nevertheless be possible to identify one or more systems meeting most of the requirements.
“Simple” bulk detection systems such as neutron or gamma backscatter, already used for
security applications, could perhaps also be useful in selected scenarios.
Note that some degree of screening of TNA systems might be possible by using material with a
high neutron capture cross section (e.g. boron, gadolinium, see also §2.3.1). On the other hand
characteristic spectral lines would be produced, which might in turn be detected.
 Trace explosive detection: large number of possibilities and scenarios exist, also concerning the
explosive source itself, which is not necessarily the target object (e.g. on a former battlefield).
Large influence of environmental parameters, target history, etc., on the variables of interest
(explosive vapour and particle concentration). Again, the range of explosives is not necessarily the
same for UXO and IEDs.
Trace explosive systems for security (law enforcement) applications, e.g. detection of IEDs, are
mature and in current use. They usually have the capability of indicating the type of explosive.
Some authors have identified sample acquisition as the primary weakness of current systems,
rather than equipment sensitivity.
Note that US public documents such as the NAP publications, the NAVEODTECHDIV reports, or
the NIJ reports, are in general quite open in the discussion of (trace) explosive detection systems.
UXO: Reliable and consistent trace explosive detection is far from easy. Operationally
useful parameters for UXO are difficult to quantify. R&D work is ongoing, including
explosive environmental fate and transport modelling, in particular for landmine detection.
Sampling is again of primary importance, and soil sampling is an option. Prototype systems
have been used to characterise exposed munitions; explosive molecules in soil samples have
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also been successfully detected (in the vicinity of landmines). Dogs are being used in
humanitarian demining also for the detection of UXO (§4.2.2).
In the Introduction we remarked that at first sight bulk explosive detection would seem to be most
appropriate for hermetically as well as some non-hermetically sealed systems, whereas trace detection would
seem to be most appropriate for non-hermetically sealed systems. This is probably still true but perhaps too
simplified a statement. For example, even for a perfectly sealed object explosive traces can be present on the
surface (which is actually rather difficult to avoid) making it detectable. On the other hand, non-hermetically
sealed objects can contain explosives with very low vapour pressure (volatility), making their vapour
detection very difficult (although one might look for impurities, explosive decomposition products or other
accompanying substances, e.g. for landmines).
Bulk detection is interesting on paper but far from being easy to apply in practice, in particular when looking
for small quantities hidden in a complex matrix, with possible interferents being present as well. Neutron
based systems are hampered by radiation hazard, NMR/NQR devices are screened by metallic enclosures.
Detection times can also be too long to be practicable, depending on the application.
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Humanitarian DEMining – Final Report (Study on the State of the Art in the EU related to
humanitarian demining technology, products and practice)”, EPFL-LAMI and VUB-ETRO, Brussels,
Belgium, July 1999. http://www.eudem.vub.ac.be/ or http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/.
[DOE92] Chemical Weapons Verification, Verification Technologies, Department of Energy/Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1st/2nd Quarters 1992, DOE/DP/OAC/VT-92A.
[EXPL99] NVESD/JUXOCO Explosive Detection Workshop, NVESD (Night Vision and Electronic
Sensors Directorate), Ft. Belvoir, VA, 25-27 August 1999. http://www.uxocoe.brtrc.com/workshp.htm ->
Detection
[JPL95] Sensor Technology Assessment for Ordnance and Explosive Waste Detection and Location,
JPL D-11367 rev B, March 1, 1995. Prepared by the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL), Caltech, Pasadena, CA,
for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Division, Huntsville, AL, and Army Yuma Proving
Grounds, Yuma, AR.
To be requested from Ms E. Moorthy, Archives and Records, JPL, phone +1 818 397-7952 (fax 7121), E-mail:
elizabeth.a.moorthy@jpl.nasa.gov, $32.40 (Sept. 1996 information).
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[NAP98a] BLACK AND SMOKELESS POWDERS: Technologies for Finding Bombs and the Bomb
Makers, Committee on Smokeless and Black Powder, Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology,
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, National Research Council. ISBN
0-309-06246-2, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 1998.
http://books.nap.edu/html/smokeless/
[NAP98b] Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings: An Integrated National Strategy for Marking,
Tagging, Rendering Inert, and Licensing Explosives and Their Precursors, Committee on Marking,
Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Materials, Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology,
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, National Research Council. ISBN
0-309-06126-1, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 1998.
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309061261/html/R1.html
Appendix F contains also a report of a visit carried out in 1997 by the report’s authors to the Swiss Scientific
Research Service. Background information about the Swiss situation and experience with tagging of explosives
is provided, as well as the corresponding conclusions about the efficacy of the strategy chosen to control harmful
and illegal uses of explosives.
[NAP99] Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: First Report, Panel on
Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security, National Materials Advisory
Board, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, Publication
NMAB-482-5. ISBN 0-309-06787-1, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 1999.
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9726.html
[NIJ99b] G. A. Eiceman, C. M. Boyett, J. E. Parmeter, Evaluation of a Test Protocol for Explosives Trace
Detectors Using a Representative Commercial Analyzer, NIJ Report 100-99, National Institute of
Justice, Office of Science and Technology, Washington, DC 20531, September 1999, NCJ 178261.
http://virlib.ncjrs.org/LawEnforcement.asp or directly http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/178261.pdf
[YIN93a] J. Yinon (Ed.), Advances in analysis and detection of explosives (proceedings of the 4th
International Symposium on Analysis and Detection of Explosives, Sept. 7-10, 1992, Jerusalem,
Israel). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993.
[YIN93b] J. Yinon and S. Zitrin, Modern methods and applications in analysis of explosives. Chichester,
UK: Wiley, 1993.
Conferences:
[RAN99] J. J. Rant, Results and conclusions of the 5th Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Conference
(Ljubljana, Slovenia, Sept. 30 – Oct. 1, 1999), INSIGHT (The Journal of The British Institute of Non-
Destructive Testing), Vol. 42, No. 2, Feb. 2000, pp. 98-101.
[SAL99] S. H. Salter, Report on the Hidden Explosives Workshop, Rovereto, Italy, June 1999, 6 pp.
Contact: shs@mech.ed.ac.uk.
Explosives:
[DIO86] B. C. Dionne, D. P. Rounbehler, E. K. Achter, J. R. Hobbs, and D. H. Fine, “Vapour Pressure of
Explosives”, Journal of Energetic Materials, 4 (1986) 447-472.
[HAA94] R. Haas, G. Möschwitzer, Rüstungsaltlasten – ein kommunales Problem, in Hermanns/Walcha
(Eds.): Ökologische Altlasten in der kommunalen Praxis. Aufgaben der Kommunalpolitik, Band 11,
Deutscher Gemeindeverlag, Köln, 1994 (in German).
http://haas.purespace.de/V16.html or from http://haas.purespace.de/start.html -> Übersicht: Rüstungs-
altlasten
[ROS91] D. H. Rosenblatt, E. P. Borrows, W. R. Mitchell, D. L. Palmer, “Organic Explosives and
Related Compounds”, The Handbook of Environmental Chemistry, Vol. 3, Part G, Ed 0 (May 24th,
1991), pp. 195-234.
General Articles:
[ROU95] A. M. Rouhi, “Government, Industry Efforts Yield Array Of Tools To Combat Terrorism”,
Chemical & Engineering News, July 24, 1995. http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/950724/art02.html
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tasks)
Page 44
[ROU97a] A. M. Rouhi, “Land Mines: Horrors Begging For Solutions”, Chemical & Engineering News,
vol. 75, no. 10, pp. 14-22, March 10 1997. http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/970310/land.html.
[ROU97b] A. M. Rouhi, “Detecting Illegal Substances”, Chemical & Engineering News, Sept. 29 1997.
http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/970929/detect.html.
Nuclear Technologies:
[BIT99] C. Bittdorf, “Nukleare Sensortechnologien (NMR/NQR, TNA/FNA)” (in German), Vortrag im
CCG-Lehrgang Landminen und ihre Beseitigung, TZN, Unterlüss, Germany, 1999.
[BRO96] D. R. Brown, T. Gozani, “Thermal neutron analysis technology”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 2936, pp.
85-94, Boston, MA, Nov. 19-20, 1996.
[GOZ96] T. Gozani, “Inspection techniques based on neutron interrogation”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 2936, pp.
9-20, Boston, MA, Nov. 19-20, 1996.
[VIE99] G. Viesti (for the EXPLODET collaboration), “Il ruolo delle tecniche nucleari nella rivelazione
di mine ed esplosivi nascosti34” (in Italian), Università degli Studi di Padova, Dipartimento di Fisica,
Pubb. DFPD 99/NP/41, Sept. 1999.
Web:
SANDIA (National Laboratories) Online Technical Library: http://infoserve.sandia.gov/
Institutions/Organisations carrying out R&D:
A number of institutions carrying out trace explosive detection research, and with which it might be
worthwhile to stay in contact, have already been mentioned in §4.2.1 and §4.2.2.
The DGA (Délégation Générale à l’Armement, the French Defence Procurement Agency) has been working
to understand the potential of neutron based systems for the characterization of chemical weapons (F.
Vettese <frederic.vettese@etca.fr>, DGA/DCE/CEB). DGA/SPART (Service des Programme d’Armement
Terrestre) has launched in the year 2000 an invitation to tender concerning a “Feasibility study for a
landmine confirmation system based on neutron interrogation”.
The EOD requirements of the NAVEODTECHDIV (Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology
Division, Indian Head, Maryland) are probably quite similar to those of other Institutions/Organisations, e.g.
35:
 UXO: Confirmatory sensor for fill. Discriminate between inert, explosive and other fills.
 IEDs: Go/no-go gage. Assist in disruption/render safe mission.
BULK Expl. Detection of Landmines and/or UXO:
[ANCxx1] Buried Landmine Specific Sensor Based on Thermal Neutron Analysis, ANCORE Corporation
(formerly SAIC Advanced Nucleonics), Santa Clara, CA, 7pp.
Contact: Douglas Brown <doug@ancore.com>.
[ANCxx2] Thermal Neutron Analysis Sensor for Mine/UXO Detection, ANCORE Corporation (formerly
SAIC Advanced Nucleonics), Santa Clara, CA (copy of presentation).
Contact: Douglas Brown <doug@ancore.com>.
[BOR00] G. M. Borgonovi, R. O. Ginaven, V. J. Orphan, Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance
Detection, in A Remotely Controlled Multi-Sensor Platform for Humanitarian Demining, Report of
the Advisory Group Meeting held 3-7 April 2000 at the IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria, IAEA
publication IAEA/PS/AG-1093.
                                                     
34
 The role of nuclear techniques in the detection of hidden mines and explosives.
35
 [EXPL99] -> NVESD/JUXOCO Explosive Detection Workshop -> Presentation by C. O’Donnell, 25/8/1999.
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[BYS00] V. M. Bystritsky, et al., “Experiments on Identification of Hidden Substances with Detection of
Particles Associated with Neutron Probing”, in Proceedings 4th Intnl. Symposium on Technology and
the Mine Problem, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Mar. 13-16, 2000.
[CRA00] R. A. Craig, A. J. Peurrung, D. C. Stromswold, “Mine Detection using Timed Neutron
Moderation”, in Proc. UXO Forum 2000, Session 10 (Detection), Anaheim, CA, May 2-4, 2000.
[HOL00] D. Holslin, J. Reed, “Transportable Inspection System for Mine Confirmation”, in Proceedings
4th Intnl. Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, Mar. 13-16, 2000.
[HUS99] E. M. A. Hussein, What can an Isotopic Neutron Source provide for Landmine Detection? A
Monte Carlo Study, in Application of Nuclear Techniques to Anti-Personnel Landmines Identification,
Report of the First Research Co-ordination Meeting held 23-26 Nov. 1999 at the Rudjer Boškovic
Institute in Zagreb, Croatia, IAEA publication IAEA/PS/RC-799. Contact: Ulf.Rosengard@iaea.org.
[IAEA99] Application of Nuclear Techniques to Anti-Personnel Landmines Identification, Report of the
First Research Co-ordination Meeting held 23-26 Nov. 1999 at the Rudjer Boškovic Institute in
Zagreb, Croatia, IAEA publication IAEA/PS/RC-799.
Contact: Ulf.Rosengard@iaea.org.
[IAEA00] A Remotely Controlled Multi-Sensor Platform for Humanitarian Demining, Report of the
Advisory Group Meeting held 3-7 April 2000 at the IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria, IAEA
publication IAEA/PS/AG-1093.
Contact: Ulf.Rosengard@iaea.org.
[MAG00] B. C. Maglich, et al., “Development of Atometer Model GammaNose™ for Humanitarian De-
mining: …”, in Proceedings 4th Intnl. Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Mar. 13-16, 2000.
[McF98] J. McFee, et al., “A Thermal Neutron Activation System for Confirmatory Non-metallic Land
Mine Detection”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3392, pp. 553-564, Orlando, FLA, April 13-17, 1998.
[MOL85] R. B. Moler (Ed.), Workshop Report: Nuclear Techniques for Mine Detection Research
(sponsored by Belvoir Research and Development Center, Ft. Belvoir, VA), Lake Luzerne, New York,
July 22-25, 1985. DTIC Ref. AD-A167 968.
[MOL91] R. B. Moler (Ed.), Technical Report: Nuclear and Atomic Methods for Mine Detection,
Department of the Army, Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center, Ft. Belvoir, VA,
Nov. 1, 1991. DTIC Ref. AD-A243 332.
[POR98] L. J. Porter, D. A. Sparrow, J. T. Broach, R. Sherbondy, J. Bendahan, “Assessment of thermal
neutron analysis applied to surface and near-surface unexploded ordnance detection”, in SPIE Proc.
Vol. 3392, pp. 533-544, Orlando, FLA, April 13-17, 1998.
[POR99] L. J. Porter, “The use of thermal neutron analysis in unexploded ordnance and mine detection”,
in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3769, pp. 126-140, Denver, CO, 19-23 July, 1999.
[RON00] T. J. Roney, R. J. Pink, T. A. White, M. Smith, K. Shetterly, “Digital Radiography and
Computed Tomography of Chemical Munitions: Development and Implementation of Field Inspection
System”, in Proceedings 4th Intnl. Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Mar. 13-16, 2000.
[SAI96] Vehicular Mine Detection Testbed, Final Scientific & Technical Report–A0002, Test/Inspection
Report–A004, Contract No. DAAB12-95-C-0030, SAIC (Scientific Applications International
Corporation), Santa Clara, CA, April 16, 1996.
[SPA98] D. A. Sparrow, L. J. Porter, J. T. Broach, R. Sherbondy, “Phenomenology of prompt gamma
neutron activation analysis in the detection of mines and near-surface ordnance”, in SPIE Proc. Vol.
3392, pp. 545-552, Orlando, FLA, April 13-17, 1998.
[VAL99] V. Valkovic, A Feasibility Study of Landmines Detection using 14 MeV Neutrons, in
Application of Nuclear Techniques to Anti-Personnel Landmines Identification, Report of the First
Research Co-ordination Meeting held 23-26 Nov. 1999 at the Rudjer Boškovic Institute in Zagreb,
Croatia, IAEA publication IAEA/PS/RC-799. Contact: Ulf.Rosengard@iaea.org.
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NOTE: Proceedings of the 4th Intnl. Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem are available on CD-ROM.
Produced by DMC Meeting Management (http://www.dmc2000.com/), contact: Carol Killip
carol@dmc2000.com.
TRACE Expl. Detection of Landmines and/or UXO:
[CHA98] W. B. Chambers, P. J. Rodacy, E. E. Jones, B. J. Gomez, R. J. Woodfin, “Chemical Sensing
System for Classification of Mine-Like Objects by Explosives Detection”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3392,
pp. 453-461, Orlando, FLA, April 13-17, 1998.
[CHA99] W. Chambers, J. Phelan, P. Rodacy, S. Reber, R. Woodfin, “Explosive Ordnance Detection in
Land and Water Environments with Solid Phase Extraction/Ion Mobility Spectrometry”, in SPIE Proc.
Vol. 3710, pp. 290-298, Orlando, FLA, April 5-9, 1999.
[CHR99] M. Christensson, P. Gardhagen, “A new portable biosensor technology for area reduction”, in
SPIE Proc. Vol. 3710, pp. 335-342, Orlando, FLA, April 5-9, 1999.
[DES98] S. Désilets, L. W. Haley, U. Thekkadath, “Trace explosive detection for finding landmines”, in
SPIE Proc. Vol. 3392, pp. 441-452, Orlando, FLA, April 13-17, 1998.
See also the extensive list of references contained therein.
[FIS98] M. Fisher, C. Cumming, M. la Grone, R. Taylor, “An Electrostatic Particle Sampler and
Chemical Sensor System for Landmine Detection by Chemical Signature”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3392,
pp. 565-574, Orlando, FLA, April 13-17, 1998.
[GEH99] M. Gehrke, S. Kapila, V. Flanigan, “Development of a Fast and Efficient Sample Enrichment
Device for Semivolatile Organics”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3710, pp. 433-444, Orlando, FLA, April 5-9,
1999.
[GEI99] M. W. Geis, R. R. Kunz, “Chemical Concentrator for Rapid Vapor Detection”, in SPIE Proc.
Vol. 3710, pp. 421-432, Orlando, FLA, April 5-9, 1999.
[GEO99] V. George, T. F. Jenkins, D. C. Leggett, J. H. Cragin, J. Phelan, J. Oxley, J. Pennington,
“Progress on Determining the Vapor Signature of a Buried Landmine”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3710, pp.
258-269, Orlando, FLA, April 5-9, 1999.
[HOR98] C. Horwood, B. Howell, R. Keeley, J.-B. Richardier (Eds.), “The use of dogs for operations
related to humanitarian mine clearance”, (2nd quarter of) 1998, ISBN 2-909064-33-6, 229 pp.
Presented at the 2nd International Expert Conf. on the Use of Modern Demining Technology at
Karlsruhe (Germany), 1 July 1998.
[LJU99] (Proceedings of the) World-Wide Mine Detecting Dog Workshop, Ljubljana, Slovenia, Sept.
13-15, 1999.
Available from HDIC at the James Madison University (http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/, E-mail hdic@jmu.edu).
[PHE98] J. M. Phelan, S. W. Webb, “Simulation of the Environmental Fate and Transport of Chemical
Signatures from Buried Landmines”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3392, pp. 509-520, Orlando, FLA, April 13-
17, 1998.
[ROD00] P. J. Rodacy, P. K. Walker, S. D. Reber, J. Phelan, J. V. Andre, “Explosive Detection in the
Marine Environment and on Land Using Ion Mobility Spectroscopy: A Summary of Field Tests”,
Sandia Report SAND2000-0921, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, April 2000, 20 pp.
(Unclassified).
[WEB99] S. W. Webb, K, Pruess, J. M. Phelan, S. A. Finsterle, “Development of a Mechanistic Model for
the Movement of Chemical Signatures From Buried Landmines/UXO”, in SPIE Proc. Vol. 3710, pp.
270-282, Orlando, FLA, April 5-9, 1999.
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8. Websites:
A list of selected Websites of interest follows (as always, not all-inclusive).
     IED (Improvised Explosive Devices)
          IEDD - Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
               http://www.pwallen.co.uk/iedd/index.html
          Equipment Manufacturers and Distributors
               http://www.bombsecurity.com/eqmflist.html
          Bombsecurity.com: The Internet's Largest Source for Information on Bomb Related Protection Issues
               http://www.bombsecurity.com/index.html
          SAIC's Center for Counterterrorism Technology & Analysis
               http://www.saic.com/gov/cctta/
          X-RAY Systems (esp. portable)
               Golden Engineering
                    http://www.goldenengineering.com/
               MinXRay, Inc.
                    http://www.minxray.com/
               SAIC: Products: Safety & Security
                    http://www.saic.com/products/security/
               Vidisco Ltd.
                    http://www.vidisco.com/
               OTHER X-RAY Systems
                    PerkinElmer Instruments / Detection Systems Formerly EG&G Astrophysics, formerly
                    Vivid Technologies, Inc
                   (http://www.eggastrophysics.com/main.htm)
     BULK Explosive Detection/ELECTROMAGNETIC
          NMR (Nuclear Magnetic Resonance)
               SwRI Patent: NMR Discrimination Apparatus and Method Therefor
                    http://www.swri.org/8special/patents/4166972.htm
               SwRI Patent: Baggage Inspection Apparatus and Method for Determining Presences of Explosives
                    http://www.swri.org/8special/patents/4514691.htm
     BULK Explosive Detection/NUCLEAR
          Landmine Detection: The Problem and the Challenge
               http://www.unb.ca/ME/LTMD/LANDMINE.htm
          LTMD Homepage (Laboratory for Threat Material Detection)
               http://www.unb.ca/ME/LTMD/
          API (Associated Particle Imaging)
               DOE/NV - Capabilities: Associated Particle Imaging
                    http://www.nv.doe.gov/business/capabilities/FieldableProto/AssocPartImg.htm
               HiEnergy Microdevices
                    http://www.hienergymicrodevices.com/
               ANL / APSTNG (Argonne National Labs)
                    Argonne - Law Enforcement Capabilities
                         http://www.techtransfer.anl.gov/techtour/lawenforce.html
                    APSTNG System
                         http://www.re.anl.gov/apstng.html
          Gamma backscatter (esp. portable)
               John Caunt Scientific Limited
                    http://www.pq62.dial.pipex.com/
               John Caunt Scientific Limited
                    http://www.johncaunt.com/
               SAIC: Products: CDS-2002i(tm) Contraband Detector: Overview
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                    http://www.saic.com/products/security/contraband_detector/cds.html
               Background info
                    2 Background
                         http://ifp.uni-muenster.de/~balla/thesis/background.html
                    Bicron: Organic Products
                         http://www.bicron.com/notegauging.htm
          NIGAS (Neutron Induced Gamma Spectrometer)
               Bruker Daltonik - Company Info
                    http://www.bruker-daltonik.de/companies.html
          ORNL (Oak Ridge Nat. Labs)
               WEAF Research and Development
                    http://www.ornl.gov/armd/r&d.htm#CPNX
          PELAN (Pulsed Elemental Analysis with Neutrons)
               Detection of Explosives (WKU Applied Physics Institute)
                    http://www.wku.edu/API/research/explo.htm
               NUMAT, Inc.
                    http://www.numat.com/
               Publications (WKU Applied Physics Institute)
                    http://www.wku.edu/API/research/public.htm
          PINS (Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy)
               ORTEC PINS Chemical Weapons Assay
                    http://www.eggortec.com/pins.htm
               ORTEC PINS Chemical Weapons Assay
                    http://www.ortec-online.com/pins.htm
               Securing the Future at INEEL
                    http://inelext1.inel.gov/science/feature.nsf/ineel/Secure
               PINS technology identifies chemical weapons
                    http://inelext1.inel.gov/science/feature.nsf/ineel/pins
          PNCAS (Pulse Neutron Chemical Analysis Sensor )
               EPPRA: European Pulsed Power Research
                  http://www.eppra.com/
          SODERN
               Sodern neutronic, neutron generator, online analyser
                    http://www.sodern.fr/SODERN/neutronicsa.htm
          OTHER BULK/NUCLEAR
               SNUPA (Slow Neutron Universal Parcel Analyser)
                    The University of Melbourne - School of Physics - Photonuclear Research Group
                         http://www.ph.unimelb.edu.au/photo/
     CONFERENCES
          2000 GRC (Gordon Research Conferences) on Illicit Substance Detection
               http://www.grc.uri.edu/programs/2000/illicit.htm
          WKU - Crete 2000--International Conference on Explosives and Drug Detection Techniques
               http://www.grc.uri.edu/programs/2000/illicit.htm
     OVERVIEW RESOURCES
          Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable
               http://www.frtr.gov/topical/uxo/index.html
          Explosive Detection Equipment Program / US Navy
               See "Tech Info Library" and "EDE Catalog -> Catalog, Survey, Vendor List"
               (http://www.explosivedetection.nfesc.navy.mil/)
          Justice Information Center (NCJRS): Research and Evaluation Documents
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               Look for "explosives" (twice -> "Guide for the Selection of Commercial Explosives Detection Systems for
               Law Enforcement Applications")
               (http://www.ncjrs.org/resdocs.htm).
          Sandia National Laboratories Technical Library Homepage
               http://infoserve.sandia.gov/index.html
          UXOCOE (UXO Center of Excellence) Workshop Notes -> NVESD/JUXOCO Explosive Detection Workshop
               (25-27 Aug 99)
               (http://www.uxocoe.brtrc.com/workshp.htm)
          UXOCOE (UXO Center of Excellence) TechReports
               http://www.uxocoe.brtrc.com/TecReports.htm
          Chemical & Engineering News
               C&EN, Detecting Illegal Substances, September 29, 1997
                    http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/970929/detect.html
               C&EN 970310 - LAND MINES: Horrors Begging for Solutions, March 10, 1997
                    http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/970310/land.html
               C&EN, Government, Industry Efforts Yield Array Of Tools To Combat Terrorism, July 24, 1995
                    http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/950724/art02.html
          Nat'l Academy Press
               Nat'l Acad Press Catalog: Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security:
                    Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: First Report, 1999
                    (http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9726.html)
               Black and Smokeless Powders
                    Black and Smokeless Powders - Technologies for Finding Bombs and the Bomb Makers, 1998
                    (http://books.nap.edu/html/smokeless/ ; also: http://stills.nap.edu/html/smokeless/)
               Nat'l Academy Press, Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings: (1998), Front Matter
                    Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings: An Integrated National Strategy for Marking, Tagging,
                    Rendering Inert, and Licensing Explosives and Their Precursors (1998)
                    (http://books.nap.edu/books/0309061261/html/R1.html)
          OTHER literature
               Justice Information - National Criminal Justice – Research and Evaluation
                    http://www.ncjrs.org/reshome.htm
               Startseite Büro für Altlastenerkundung und Umweltforschung Dr. Rainer Haas
                  Reference documents on explosives (in German)
                    (http://haas.purespace.de/start.html).
     TRACE Explosive Detection
          Barringer Technologies Inc.
               http://www.barringer.com/
          Electronic Sensor Technology Intro Page
               http://www.estcal.com/
          Explorer 2000 / NUSS
               http://www.via.at/explorer2000/
          Explosive Detection Equipment or Services
               http://www.pseag.org/CWG_Products/Explosive%20Detection%20Equipment%20or%20Services_1.html
          Graseby Dynamics Limited - A Member of Smiths Industries Aerospace Group
               http://www.grasebydynamics.com/
          IDS Intelligent Detection Systems
               http://www.idsdetection.com/
          IDS Analytical + Security Division
               http://www.tracedetection.com/
          Ion Track Instruments
               http://www.iontrack.com/
          I.U.T. GmbH
               http://www.iut-berlin.com/
          MSA Instrument Division - Permanent Instruments - FIS Project
               http://www.msanet.com/instruments/ps/permanent/fis/index.htm
          Nomadics, Inc. - Portable sensors and wireless solutions for the future
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               http://www.nomadics.com/
          Thermedics Detection Inc. Web Site Intro Page 1
               http://www.tdxinc.com/intro01.html
          OTHER TRACE
               INFICON HAPSITE Field Portable GC/MS - Test VOCs On-Site
                    http://www.hapsite.com/
               Syagen Technology, Inc.: High-Throughput Molecular Analysis
                    http://www.syagen.com/
               TDC - Bringing explosives to light - An innovative laser detection system
                    http://www.tc.gc.ca/TDC/r&d/v9n1.htm
     SWISS Institutions
          Gruppe Rüstung Internet (Swiss Defence Procurement Agency)
               http://www.gr.admin.ch/
          Bundesamt für Polizei (Swiss Federal Office for Police)
               http://www.admin.ch/bap/
          Institut de Police Scientifique et Criminologie (ipsc)
               http://www.unil.ch/ipsc/
          Le corps des gardes-frontière en bref
               http://www.douane.admin.ch/f/chzollf/kuerze_gwkf/gwk_kurz_f.htm
          Police Cantonale Genevoise
               http://www.geneve.ch/police/welcome.html
          Wissenschaftlicher Dienst (Scientific Research Service)
               http://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/kap05/stadtpolizei/wissenschaftlicher_dienst/index.htm
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9. Contacts:
The following is a list of institutes, organisations or individuals which have been contacted for the study (per
country ordered alphabetically), or which are known or at least strongly supposed to have an interest in the
subject. Not all of the contacted persons did necessarily reply. Individual names and coordinates have been
omitted; we will try to add them after explicit authorisation and keep the list updated. A number of Websites
of interest have in fact already been mentioned in Ch. 8.
SWITZERLAND
Institut de Police Scientifique et Criminologie (IPSC), Univ. de Lausanne (School of Forensic Science and
Criminology)
Police Cantonale Genevoise, Detachement Specialistes Depiegeage (DSD) (Geneva Cantonal Police)
Service Controle Passagers, Aeroport de Geneve, (Passenger Control Service, Geneva Airport)
Paul Scherrer Institut (PSI), Villingen
SM Altdorf (Swiss Ammunition Enterprise Corp.)
EPFL-DP-IGA (Institut de Génie Atomique – Institute of Nuclear Engineering)
Bundesamt für Polizei (BAP), Dienst für Analyse und Prävention (Federal Office for Police, Service for Analysis
and Prevention)
Stadpolizei Zuerich, Wissenschaftlicher Forschungsdienst (WFD) (Zurich City Police, Scientific Research Service)
Commandement (du Corps) des Gardes-Frontiere (Grenzwachtkorps), Geneve (Frontier Guards Command,
Geneva)
Kantonspolizei Zuerich, Flughafenpolizei (Zurich Cantonal Police, Airport Police)
OTHER
Institut fuer Rechtsmedizin, Univ. Bern (Forensic Medicine Institute)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
Police Cantonale Vaudoise, Groupement Specialistes Depiegeage (Canton of Vaud Police)
GROUPS / LISTS
analysisexplosives@egroups.com (moderated by J. Yinon – see USA)
AUSTRALIA
Department of Physics, Univ. of Melbourne
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO)
University of Western Australia (UWA)
AUSTRIA
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
CANADA
Security Specifications and Guidance Material Section, ICAO Headquarters, Montreal
Laboratory for Threat Material Detection, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of New Brunswick
(UNB)
John McFee, Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES)
Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT)
New Technology Div., Barringer Research
CROATIA
Ministry of Interior
Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) Scientific Council
DENMARK
DEMEX
CAT
FRANCE
SODERN
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TDA Armements SAS
Ecole Polytechnique
CEDALES
EPPRA Sarl
Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA-LETI), Grenoble
Institut de Saint Louis (ISL)
Thomson-CSF Detexis
Delegation Generale a l'Armement (DGA), Centre d'Etudes du Bouchet (CEB)
GERMANY
IABG, Munich
Bruker Saxonia Analytik GmbH, Leipzig
Fraunhofer Institut fuer Chemische Technologie (ICT)
Institut fuer Umwelttechnologien (IUT), Berlin
TZN
Wehrwissenschaftliches Institut fuer Schutztechnologien (WIS), ABC-Schutz, Munster (German Armed Forces
Scientific Institute for Protection Technologies – NBC-Protection)
ISRAEL
SOREQ
ITALY
Univ. Trento
Joint Research Centre (JRC) Ispra
LNL / INFN
ABC
Univ. Padova / INFN
NETHERLANDS
TNO-FEL
Dutch Forensics Science Laboratory, Section Explosives
TU Delft
RUSSIA
Department of Physics, Kaliningrad State University
Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, Dubna, ?
Institute of Applied Physics, Novosibirsk
Department of Applied Nuclear Physics, Cherenkov Laboratory, Lebedev Physical Institute (LPI) of RAS (Russian
Academy of Science)
SLOVENIA
IJS (Jozef Stefan Institute)
SOUTH AFRICA
CSIR
MECHEM
Department of Physics, University of the Witwatersrand
SWEDEN
Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA) Linkoeping
Biosensor Applications AB
Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA) Stockholm
SWEDEC
UNITED KINGDOM
Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University
BTG PLC
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John Caunt Systems
BARIC Consultants
DERA Fort Halstead (?), Sevenoaks
ERA Technology
Institute of Munition Clearance Engineers
DERA Porton Down
BACTEC
King's College London (KCL)
Chemical and Biological Weapons Research Unit (Porton Down), DERA
RV Consultancy
UNITES STATES
Inficon, portable GC/MS
Ancore Corp (ex Advanced Nucleonics Division of SAIC)
SAIC (US) (Science Applications International Corporation)
Poulter Laboratory, SRI International
Univ. of Florida
Univ. of Maryland
Harvard
Special Technologies Laboratory, Department of Energy (DoE)
Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)
James Madison University (JMU)
HiEnergy Microdevices
Federal Aviation Administration
Bombs Away, Guam
Chemical & Engineering News
Applied Physics Institute, Western Kentucky Universit, PELAN system
National Center for Forensic Science, University of Central Florida
     ARMY, Defence (General)
OE Team, U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center (USACE), Huntsville
Technology Integration, Pentagon
U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center (USACE), Huntsville
UXO Center of Excellence (UXOCOE)
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
US Army Environmental Center (AEC), Aberdeen Proving Ground
US DoD SO/LIC (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflicts)
     ARGONNE National Labs
Argonne National Lab (ANL)
Argonne National Lab (ANL) Technology Transfer
     INEEL (Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory)
INEEL
UXO/Demining Initiative, INEEL
Integrated Defense Systems
     NAVY
NRL (Naval Research Lab)
Navy EOD Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV)
Research & Development, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Port Hueneme, CA
     QM (Quantum Magnetics)
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Quantum Magnetics
SANDIA National Labs
Contraband Detection Technologies Department, Sandia National Laboratories
Explosive Technologies Group, Sandia National Laboratories
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tasks)
Page 55
ANNEX:
A1. Other Explosive/Contraband Detection Technologies:
A1.1. Neutron Backscatter:
Neutron backscatter is probably the simplest neutron based technique. It relies on fast neutrons emitted into
the target (as we have seen they can penetrate easily several cm of steel if necessary), where they are slowed
down by collisions with hydrogen nuclei. The number of detected backscattered thermalised neutrons, i.e.
slow neutrons coming back in the direction of the source, provides a measure of the hydrogen content of the
material. These devices are therefore also called “Neutron Thermalisation Gauges” (NTG), and are in current
use in a number of other fields (ex. petroleum industry).
Current applications of neutron backscatter systems include for example the discrimination of ordnance
containing explosives, inert substances and chemical warfare agents based on the considerable differences
in their hydrogen content. A system has also been reported to have been in use for quite some time to detect
explosives hidden in car doors, tyres, etc. For the detection of buried objects (e.g. landmines) the system has
problems in presence of too much water and seems therefore likely to only work in dry or slightly humid
environments. Tests with a time-tagged radioactive source are detailed in [CRA00] (for landmine detection).
The “Neutrotest” system developed by I.U.T. (http://www.iut-berlin.de/), for example, is composed from a
technical point view of a BF3 proportional neutron counter and a fast neutron radioactive source, usually of
the AmBe (Americium-Beryllium) type, located in the same head36. The final system is rather light and
simple, and gives a quick answer useful to prescreen objects. Known calibration curves are used, or scaling
factors when encountering new geometries. In the case of larger munition several measurements might have
to be taken along its profile.
HCM (Hydrogen Concentration Monitor), developed by the German Armed Forces Scientific Institute for
Protection Technologies – NBC-Protection (WIS-ABC) in Munster, Germany, uses a small and weak 252Cf
source and a 3He thermal neutron detector [BUC98]. The dimensions of the sensor system are 50x60x200
mm with a weight of 1.2 kg. As some background is generated in the floor and the walls of a building, a
certain distance from the floor, depending on the object being analysed, is necessary. A counting time of 60
sec is sufficient to accumulate about 1000 events (i.e. backscattered neutrons), which results in a statistical
uncertainty of 3%. The counting rate is influenced by the diameter of the samples (shells), the wall thickness
and material. Standard calibration curves have therefore to be measured for different shell calibres and
wall materials, and correction factors for pallets for example. A database containing the detailed calibration
curves is integrated into the HCM evaluation software. The HCM is in use by the OPCW (Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) inspectors.
HCM is sold in Germany by ESM Eberline Instruments GmbH, Frauenauracher Str. 96, D-91056 Erlangen,
Germany, Tel. +49 (0)9131-909-0, Fax +49 (0)9131-909-205. It is distributed in other parts of Europe by
John Caunt Scientific Limited, PO Box 1052, Oxford OX2 6YE, UK (http://www.johncaunt.com/, John Caunt
<johncaunt@dial.pipex.com>).
The application of neutron backscatter systems for the task of interest to us is likely to be problematic: 1) for
partially buried munition (soil influence), 2) for unknown munition (unknown calibration curve), 3) and
possibly also when detecting black powder (does not contain hydrogen, see §1.1) or incendiary munition
(does usually not contain hydrogen). Hydrogen will be present in some inert fillers such as waxes, or
whenever some water is present, which might increase the false alarm rate. On the other hand it might still be
true that when no signal is detected no hydrogen – and therefore no explosive – is contained in the UXO.
Whether this turns out to be useful in practice remains to be seen, but the simplicity of neutron backscatter
devices might well warrant some practical investigation. Obviously only if it is possible to put the detector in
contact with the UXO, or at least in close proximity.
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 The I.U.T. “Neutrotest” documentation specifies that “fast neutrons penetrate easily 4 cm thick steel walls”.
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[BUC98] F.-W. Buchholz, L. Schänzler, G. Tumbrägel, “Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) of
Chemical Weapons: Hydrogen Concentration Measurements (HCM) by Thermal Neutron Detection”,
German Armed Forces Institute for Protection Technologies – NBC-Protection (WIS-ABC), Munster,
Germany, Nov. 1998.
A1.2. Gamma Backscatter:
Gamma backscatter sensors are relatively simple units that can be employed to detect hidden organic
material, typically drugs or other contraband, based on the fact that the latter (the lighter elements)
generates intense backscattering when hit by the emitted γ-rays. For some information on the current
applications of such units and the physics behind them see for example http://www.bicron.com/notegauging.htm.
An example of such a sensor is the SEARCHER unit, which is already in use for police and customs
applications. The unit is battery powered and one-man portable, and relies on a cobalt-57 (57Co) source and
associated detector electronics to detect the presence of material within a depth of about 10 cm. A simple
audible signal is delivered, which also depends on the thickness of the material being analysed; with use the
operator learns to interpret the audible signals. The source has a half-life of 270 days, therefore a source
change is recommended every two years (although adjusting the gain allows to reach four years). Note that
when the probe is turned ON and in use, no part of any person should be allowed within 30 cm of the face of
the probe. The approximate price is in the 10.000£ range.
The SEARCHER was developed by JCS (John Caunt Scientific Limited, coordinates as in §A1.1), and is
sold through S&D Security (Equipment) Ltd.
The SAIC CDS-2002i™ Contraband Detector is probably another unit working on similar principles. It
employs a low-level 100 µCi (Standard) or a 10µCi (Exempt) 133Ba radioactive source, and is detailed at
http://www.saic.com/products/security/contraband_detector/cds.html.
A1.3. CWA Chlorine Detection by TNA:
We have already seen that TNA systems are also employed for the detection of typical key elements in
Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA). As TNA is very sensitive to chlorine (i.e. chlorine can be easily
detected), and chlorine is present in a large number of CWA, in particular old chemical weapons37 such as
those from WWI, specific simplified TNA systems have been designed and are available.
One of them is CDS (Chlorine Detection System) by the German Armed Forces Scientific Institute for
Protection Technologies – NBC-Protection (WIS-ABC) in Munster, Germany, which was presented to the
OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) in Sept. 1997 partly as an alternative to the
more comprehensive but larger NIPPS system (see §3.4). CDS is a small and rugged device relying on a
252Cf source (10 times less intense than for the normal NIPPS system) and on a compact uncooled BGO
detector to detect the chlorine capture γ-rays (the most intense have an energy of 1.165, 1.955 and 6.111
MeV). Chlorine concentrations above 20 g can be measured in 2 to 5 minutes [BUC97].
CDS is sold in Germany by Target Systemelectronic GmbH, Kölner Str. 99, D-42651 Solingen, Germany,
Tel. +49 (0)212-2220-9090, Fax +49 (0)212-201045.
[BUC97] F.-W. Buchholz, L. Schänzler, G. Tumbrägel, “Chlorine Detection by a Simple NIPPS System:
CDS”, German Armed Forces Institute for Protection Technologies – NBC-Protection (WIS-ABC),
Munster, Germany, Sept. 1997.
                                                     
37
 All blister agents and all choking agents as well as most irritants contain large portions of chlorine.
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A1.4. Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR):
The Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) technique is based on the ability to measure the characteristic
absorption of radio frequency (RF) signals by certain nuclei of a target material. To induce nuclear magnetic
resonance, a sample material is placed in a volume surrounded by large magnets that produce a (usually
strong) uniform magnetic field. The nuclei of the sample material, subjected to this directional magnetic
field, align themselves in the applied field according to their nuclear magnetic moment. As sample atoms are
energised by an external source (a weak radiofrequency field, in the MHz range), they will transition
between discrete energy states, as dictated by their magnetic alignment, and thus absorb a fraction of the
incident radiofrequency (RF) energy. The measurement and chemical interpretation of these energy
transitions constitute NMR analysis. The frequencies at which the probe absorbs some RF power (i.e. peaks
in the frequency spectrum) are determined in practical terms either by sweeping the frequency itself, or by
keeping it fixed and modulating the intensity of the applied magnetic field (see also [YIN99]).
A particular form of NMR, the Fourier Transform Proton (i.e. Hydrogen) NMR (FT-1H-NMR), has been
suggested for the detection of explosives. By analysing and processing the total hydrogen NMR signal, any
contribution to the response produced by hydrogen in explosives can be separated from that (usually much
larger) produced by the hydrogen in most other materials. In practical terms, the RF field is applied in short
pulses of controlled width and amplitude, and the corresponding NMR responses are transient RF signals
emitted by the excited nuclei. Two parameters have a particular importance, T1 and T2. T1 is the so-called
spin-lattice relaxation time, which is the characteristic time for a nuclear spin system to come to equilibrium
with its surroundings after a disturbance (such as the previously mentioned RF pulses, or a change in the
applied field). T1 sets the time required to detect an NMR response, and the rate at which NMR tests might
be repeated without signal degradation. T2 is the so-called spin-spin relaxation time, which is the
characteristic time for a spin system to come to transversal equilibrium following a disturbance. The
transient, free induction decay (FID) signal following a single transmitter pulse decreases in amplitude at a
rate which is dependent upon T2 (in a homogenous magnetic field).
T1 and T2 are characteristic of the molecular structure and the state of the sample material. Measurements
have been reported, in particular at a frequency of 3 MHz, showing that these two constants for explosives
can be well separated from other common materials of interest, T1 being long (1-10 sec) and T2 short (10–4-
10–6 sec). Additional selectivity is provided in FT-1H-NMR by the 1H-NMR to 14N-NQR level crossings, but
we will not go here into further details. Note that the sensitivity is not affected by the distribution of the
sample, only by the total material present.
NMR techniques can therefore determine the presence of materials with the chemical composition of
explosives. The FT-1H-NMR technique described above has been in particular extensively tested. All
samples, however, must be passed through the magnetic coils (with a higher field intensity allowing higher
signal to noise ratios), thus limiting accessibility and configuration of NMR systems. This is probably one of
the reasons why no such systems are commercially available, to the best of our knowledge. Other reasons
might be the detection time, or the need for very good field homogeneity over large working volumes. The
inability of detecting explosive contained within metallic enclosures (screening by Faraday effect) might also
be a problem (see also the NQR section). Iron or large amounts of ferromagnetic metals can cause field
distortion and reduce effectiveness.
NMR techniques for the detection of explosives have been for example extensively studied at the South West
Research Institute (http://www.swri.org/). See for example “Baggage Inspection Apparatus and Method for
Determining Presences of Explosives”, A. De Los Santos, J. D. King, W. L. Rollwitz, G. A. Matzkanin, P.
A. Hornung, South West Research Institute, US Patent # 4,514,691, 30/04/1985, and also [YIN93a]. NMR
techniques for drug detection have also been studied at Quantum Magnetics (http://www.qm.com/).
We will not enter here into the details of another RF resonance absorption method, Electron Spin Resonance
(ESR) or Electron Paramagnetic Resonance (EPR), just mentioning that it is limited to small proportion of
materials (those which have free spins), but when applicable is much more sensitive than NMR. One such
material is black powder, which cannot be detected by proton NMR (it does not contain hydrogen).
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A1.5. Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR):
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR), a derivative of NMR, is a bulk inspection technology for
detecting crystalline explosive solids containing nitrogen-14 (14N) nuclei such as RDX, TNT, and nitrates.
NQR has been described as “an electromagnetic resonance screening technique with the specificity of
chemical spectroscopy”.
Unlike NMR where an external (static) magnetic field is needed, quadrupole resonance takes advantage of
the material’s natural crystalline electric field gradient38, i.e. the electrical gradients available within the
molecule itself. These gradients are due to the distribution of the electrical charge within the molecule and do
therefore depend on the chemical structure (they will be different for RDX, for TNT, etc.). The electrical
field gradients align the electric quadrupole moments, which are a physical property due to a non-spherical
(say ellipsoidal) nuclear charge distribution, of the 14N nuclei. As a result, the material being diagnosed need
not be contained within large magnetic field-producing coils. NQR resembles therefore to NMR without a
magnet.
When a low-intensity RF signal is applied to the material at certain frequencies, usually in the range 0.5 to 6
MHz, the alignment of the 14N nuclei is altered. As the RF is removed, the nuclei precess to their original
state (actually a transition between the energy states resulting from the previously described interaction),
producing a characteristic radio signal. The signal can then be measured for analysis. Detecting the presence
of explosives becomes similar to tuning a radio to a particular station, and the uniqueness of a molecule’s
electric field allows NQR technology to be highly compound specific. This high selectivity is partly a
disadvantage, as it is apparently not that easy to build a multichannel system necessary to cover a wide range
of target substances.
The actual setup (geometry) depends on the application at hand, and there are a number of situations, such as
in landmine detection and perhaps for the identification of IEDs, in which a single-sided (remote) geometry
is necessary, as it might be impossible to put parts of the sensor on “the other side of the object”. Also,
similarly to metal detectors the generated and the received field decay very quickly with distance; the
detection distance will therefore be limited and the equipment will probably have to be used in close
proximity to the object or to the ground. Power requirements are also considerable. Whether these issues are
problematic depends obviously a lot from the target application.
The impossibility of detecting substances fully screened by metallic enclosures (also foils, depending on their
thickness) is an issue like for NMR. What will however probably happen is that the presence of such objects
throws the NQR probe out of tune, in which case the operator knows that something is wrong. It might also
still be possible to detect explosives in imperfectly shielded objects, e.g. within metallic containers having
holes or slots or other regions where there are poor electrical connections (possibly even some UXO!)39, but
this will result in a correspondingly weaker NQR signal. Practical applicability is therefore likely to be an
issue.
Detection times are likely to be higher than a few (tens of) seconds, depending on type and quantity of the
target substance (especially on its T1 relaxation time), and on its distance for one-sided applications. In
addition, the signal to noise ratio increases with frequency as ω3/2, which implies that detection of TNT is
much harder than detection of RDX, for which NQR systems have been shown to be very promising40.
Signals are in general rather weak, so that some form of signal averaging is usually necessary – as well as
shielding, because the detector will work (at least for TNT) straight in the AM broadcasting band! Spurious
signals have also been reported due to “acoustic ringing” effects (due to certain metals and metal coatings),
as well as due to piezoelectric responses from silica in the soil (for applications such as landmine detection).
All these effect are being tackled using appropriate pulsing sequences and detection software, as well as
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 A field’s gradient corresponds to its spatial derivative, and is therefore only different from zero when the field is not
homogeneous.
39
 John Smith, King’s College London, Private Comm., June/July 2000.
40
 The spectral lines of TNT are all below 1 MHz, those of RDX are at 3.410 MHz and 5.192 MHz (amongst others).
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specific hardware. Care will have also to be taken of the temperature dependency of the spectral lines,
selecting for example those NQR transitions which are least affected by temperature changes (e.g. 3.410
MHz line instead of 5.192 MHz for RDX).
NQR for explosive detection has been intensively researched in both the UK and US in the context of
defence applications, in particular in the UK at King’s College in London (KCL, Prof. John Smith) under
sponsorship of DERA, at DERA itself and at ERA Technology (especially equipment manufacturing,
http://www.era.co.uk/, David.Daniels@era.co.uk) [BRU99]. In the US Quantum Magnetics, now part of
InVision Technologies, has licensed the NQR technique from the Naval Research Lab and is also currently
engaged in prototype developments (http://www.qm.com/). At the time of writing there are actually two
systems being advertised by Quantum Magnetics, the QSAN™ QR160 (for carry-on baggage) and the
QSAN™ QR 500 (for checked baggage, mail and parcels); these detectors are two channel systems. Some
prices are quoted in [NIJ98]. R&D was also carried out in the former Soviet Union, in Kaliningrad (Prof.
Grechiskin, Kaliningrad State University) and in Novosibirsk, as well as in Slovenia (R. Blinc, Jozef Stefan
Institute, Ljubljana). Note that some of the work has also been aimed at the analysis of suspicious objects
using different system configurations, but no commercially available systems have appeared yet (equipment
is only available to a bespoke design requirement).
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A2. Operational Aspects:
In order to better carry out this study we tried to analyse the task at hand also from an operational point of
view (i.e. if and how explosive detectors are used in practice, or could be used), in addition to working on the
technical point of view (sensor analysis). To better cover the spectrum of explosive detection several
interviews were carried out mainly in Switzerland with representatives of the Police forces, EOD teams, the
Police Scientific Research Service, and airport security.
A few key points will be summarised in the following paragraphs, which do not pretend to be exhaustive,
also because individual techniques often vary considerably according to the precise circumstances and much
can be left to individual judgement. In addition, the case of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) presents
understandable security issues.
Operational aspects and scenarios pertaining to Law Enforcement applications are considered in detail in
[NIJ99a, NIJ98], as well as in [NAV97].
A2.1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Tasks:
We are considering here mainly Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks as carried out routinely and
domestically. In most cases the UXO should not be touched nor displaced, at least initially. The main
problem is to establish if the UXO is inert or not (and in some cases if it is incendiary, containing
phosphorus, or not). A judgement is formulated using several elements which help in identifying the
munition:
 Presence of coloured bands arranged according to a precise colour code (with some exceptions as
usual...).
 Comparison with printed handbooks or electronic databases.
 General information on the munition’s history (if available), how it was found, where it was
found, etc.
 Other background knowledge, e.g. which munition is predominant in a given area (most
common main explosives: TNT, RDX). Chemical munition is an issue in a number of areas of
Belgium, France and Germany for example.
 Technical means can be employed to determine the munition’s state and internals (often of the
detonator), typically X-ray systems combined with radiographic films or real-time imaging
systems (zoom possibility, image enhancement, image storage capability, possibility of sharing
images), or γ-ray based devices (e.g. Gammamat). For the latter security concerns have been raised
by some operators due to the need for a possibly intense radioactive source. X-ray images are for
example used in some scenarios to determine if the munition contains chemical warfare material
by slightly inclining it (a diagonal line corresponding to the liquid level can be seen), or if it
contains a detonator different from the one of the standard munition.
When the object has been identified it can be rendered safe according to known procedures, to be then
disposed of later on, or destroyed in situ if necessary and possible. If the UXO cannot be identified, for
example when the object is in a very bad state or when it is unknown, a decision has to be taken based on the
elements at hand. Normally one tends to minimise risks and stay on the safe side. Possible destruction means
include standard (TNT) explosives charges, shaped charges (e.g. from the Swiss Ammunition Enterprise
Corp., or SM), or pyrotechnic torches where applicable (FireAnt, etc.).
Still concerning X-ray systems, INEEL (Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory) has
developed a field portable X-ray Digital Radiography and Computed Tomography (DRCT) scanner, which
has allowed to obtain high-quality radiographs and tomographic41 images of (chemical) munition at the site
where the munition is stored or recovered [RON00]. Stereoscopic methods have also been suggested to
provide information about the depth structure of the object being analysed [RAN99]. Fixed site tomographic
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 A 3D volume of information is acquired and processed; it can then be displayed as 2D images along any axis.
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installations for Non-Destructive Ordnance Evaluation have also been reported, but these are probably large
systems and do not directly concern EOD applications.
Last but absolutely not least, whether or not the probing method or system being investigated risks to
activate the UXO’s detonator, either because of the probing radiation itself or because of the system’s
electronics for example, should obviously be known or checked beforehand (!).
A2.2. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs):
As we already said, the case of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), which is mostly a Police task,
presents understandable security issues, particularly concerning the details of the actual operational
procedures. This fact, combined with this study’s priority being on the UXO rather than on the IED side,
results in the following information being far from exhaustive. Some aspects related to Airport Security are
dealt with later on.
To analyse the object’s state and internals portable X-ray equipment is used by some units, again combined
with radiographic films or real-time imaging systems (most of the comments of A2.1 still apply).
Concerning bulk explosive detection, neutron backscatter devices, which are basically hydrogen detectors,
have apparently also been employed (see A1.1). Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) systems have been tested
for airport security applications (see also A2.3). They seem to be commercially available in different
versions, e.g. from the ANCORE Corp., to check mail, parcels, cars, etc., mostly as fixed installations. Their
actual level of diffusion is not clear. Whether neutron based systems will get really portable remains to be
seen. Radiation hazard is obviously also present and has to be dealt with. For a description of advanced X-
ray systems see again §2.1, and §A2.3.
Work is ongoing on Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) based systems (see A1.5), for example either by
using a single coil in a one sided geometry, or by employing pairs of coils when the object can be accessed
from both sides. Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR, see A1.4) was also seen as a potential candidate in the
late 80’s, early 90’s.
Trace explosive detection devices are on the other hand widely available, although opinions diverge on their
practical applicability for this task. One of the key issues resides in how to bring the explosive (in)to the
probe and how to maximise the sampling efficiency, see for example §4.1 and Annex A3 as well as the
references cited therein.
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A2.3. Airport Security:
Detection of explosive devices is obviously also an issue in airport security applications, and a particularly
challenging one. The only bulk explosive detection systems in widespread use seem to be advanced X-ray
machines (see §2.1), incorporating a range of innovations such as backscatter, dual energy X-ray beams,
tomography for 3D object analysis, and possibly X-ray diffraction pattern analysis. They can provide
automatic threat detection algorithms or at least assist the operator in taking a decision. In either case, at the
end of the day it is necessary to appropriately balance detection rate with false alarm rate [YIN99]. Standard
X-ray machines have obviously been used for quite a long time, but as we said more in the role of systems to
detect weapons and the clues to the explosive device such as switches, detonators, wires, etc., rather than the
explosive itself.
New bulk explosive detection techniques seem to have been tested in the last years, for example NQR or
TNA, but apparently it is not easy to satisfy all the requirements, in particular the need for high throughput
(and therefore little time for each piece of luggage, say some seconds) coupled to a reasonably low false
alarm rate. A reasonable cost and complexity do also play a role, as well as environmental factors for
example in the case of neutron based systems. An additional complexity comes from the need of having to
detect a relatively small device in a large complex and variable matrix (a piece of luggage and its contents).
As an example, problems with TNA systems due to the presence of other nitrogen containing substances
(including food!) have been reported. On the other hand, the dissuasive role of explosive detection
equipment should probably not be underestimated.
Trace explosive detection has seen an increasing level of success in the last couple of decades, is now
routinely featured in a number of airports and seems to feature a rather low false alarm rate. Particle
detection in particular is feasible, as the objects at hand can be touched and swiped. To have an idea of which
trace explosive detection systems are deployed see for example [NAP99, Ch. 7] for the case of US airports.
A2.4. Search Applications:
Search applications involve situations where a bomb is suspected of being in a general area, but the exact
location is unknown. This would include, for example, searching a building or property grounds for a bomb,
once a bomb threat has been communicated. In most search applications, canine detection will be the
detection method of choice because of the dog’s rapid mobility and its ability to follow the scent to its
source.
We will not enter here into further details, nor cover other applications such as the detection of explosives in
large containers.
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A3. Commercially Available TRACE Explosive Detection Systems:
The following subsections discuss specific trace explosive detection technologies. As reference documents
we have based ourselves on [YIN99] and in particular on the [NIJ99a] market survey of trace and X-ray
based commercial detection systems for Law Enforcement applications (known to the authors as of October
1998), from which we quote extensively without necessarily repeating in each paragraph the reference to
these two publications. A listing of different trace technologies and their acronyms has already been given in
Table 5. [STE98] also contains a wide overview and a large number of references.
As in [NIJ99a], inclusion of specific technologies in this document does not represent endorsement of the
corresponding systems. Also, these references do not pretend to be all-inclusive.
A3.1. Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS):
Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) makes uses of the different mobilities42 of ionised species in gases and is
one of the most widely used techniques for trace detection. The spectrometer consists of two main sections:
the ionisation region and the drift region. Ambient air is typically drawn into an inlet port at the rate of a few
hundred cubic centimetres per minute (ccm/min) and enters the ionisation region, where electrons interact
with the incoming molecules to form positive or negative ions (as in the case of explosives). The source of
the ionising electrons is a small, sealed piece of metal that has been coated with a radioactive material,
usually nickel-63 (63Ni). Tritium has also been used (e.g. in the I.U.T. IMS system).
The ions are then periodically admitted into the drift region through an electronically shuttered gate. This
“drift” of the ions from one end of the drift region to the other occurs at atmospheric pressure, with many
collisions between the ions and the various molecules present. The time it takes the ions to travel the length
of the drift region is called the drift time and depends on their mobility. The drift time is a complex function
of the charge, mass, and size of the ion (and its molecular structure?), and allows the identification of the
substance. Typical drift times are on the order of a few milliseconds (1 ms = 0.001 s). Examples of ion
mobility spectra are shown in [YIN99] as well as in several of the manufacturers’ brochures.
The current collected at the metal plate is measured as a function of time, and an IMS spectrum is a plot of
ion current versus time, with different peaks representing different specific ions. Sometimes an additional
gas called the dopant or carrier gas is admitted into the IMS to aid in the ionisation process; very commonly
methylene chloride or some other gas that easily forms chloride ions is used. Ions from this gas usually form
the largest peak in the IMS spectrum, commonly known as the reactant ion peak or RIP, which serves as a
reference peak. The overall signal to noise ratio is usually increased by repetitively scanning the spectrum
and signal averaging (a single mobility spectrum can be generated in some tens of msec).
A number of companies market IMS systems, see Table 6. Upkeep costs vary from system to system, but are
moderate in most cases. Most IMS systems are small and portable enough to be moved around in a standard
vehicle, and can be operated by a person with only a few hours of training. These instruments have response
times of only a few seconds, the proven ability to detect a number of key explosives, sub-ppb/sub-
nanogram43 sensitivity and low false alarm rate. The most effective means for collecting a sample for
presentation to one of these systems is surface swiping, but vacuum collection of samples is also possible
with many systems. Some of the potential drawbacks include:
 The presence of a small sealed radioactive source, more on the licensing side (the source does not
pose any health risks).
 IMS is carried out at atmospheric pressure. Recalibration may be necessary when the atmospheric
pressure changes (e.g. when changing altitude by more than 100 m say, or during inclement
weather, e.g. storms), as the drift time is affected and therefore the peak positions.
 The warm-up time is usually of the order of 10 min, but up to 1 hour has also been reported.
                                                     
42
 An ion’s mobility is defined as the ratio of drift velocity and applied electric field.
43
 Tens to hundreds of picograms, see also Table 6 and [YIN99].
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 The ion mobility spectra can be quite complex! But it is true that the end user does not necessarily
have to look at them.
 Decontamination time (after an excess of substance) can be an issue, possibly up to several hours.
 Peak resolution might not be sufficient for certain applications (two different ions of similar size
and mass may appear to give only a single peak rather than two distinct peaks). This might happen
for example in the presence of several kinds of compounds in the probe sample, resulting in
increased complexity of the ion mobility spectra, which often cannot be interpreted exactly.
The last problem can be eased by adding a Gas Chromatograph (GC) to the IMS, which is basically a
hollow tube, usually packed with beads that are coated with a special chemical substance, referred to as the
stationary phase. This coating interacts more strongly with some molecules than with others, so if a gas flow
containing different types of molecules is admitted into the GC, molecules that interact more strongly with
the stationary phase will take longer to pass through the column. This means that an originally random
mixture of different molecules can be sorted by type, with each species exiting the GC at a different time (the
retention time). And if two molecules have identical drift times in an IMS, they will almost certainly have
different retention times in the GC, and their peaks can thus be temporally resolved because they will enter
the IMS at different times. Combined systems of this type are referred to as GC/IMS and are obviously
somewhat more expensive, featuring longer analysis times as well.
A3.2. Chemiluminescence (CL):
Most explosive compounds contain either nitro (NO2) or nitrate (NO3) groups (see also Table 1), a fact which
is exploited by detectors based on the ChemiLuminescence (CL) principle (CL devices are also known as
Thermal Energy Analysers, or TEA [YIN99]). In these detectors explosive molecules are first pyrolyzed to
produce nitric oxide (NO), which then reacts with ozone (O3) in an evacuated reaction chamber maintained
at a pressure of about 3 torr (0.4 kPa), resulting in excited state molecules, NO2*. The latter de-excite to NO2
by emitting infrared light of a characteristic frequency (0.6-2.8 µm), which is detected by a photomultiplier
placed behind a red filter to block any light with frequency higher than the near IR. The photomultiplier’s
signal output is directly proportional to the amount of NO present in the reaction chamber. Summarising (n,k
depend on the explosive type and the reaction conditions):
Explosive molecule → (pyrolysis) n NO + k NO2 + …,   NO + O3 → NO2* + O2 ,  NO2* →  NO2 + hν (IR)
Chemiluminescence by itself is not capable of identifying what type of explosive molecule is present, as the
NO could have been produced by other substances (i.e. interferents). CL detectors are therefore coupled to a
front-end gas chromatograph (GC), which allows different molecules that are detected with the
chemiluminescence detector to be specifically identified based on their GC retention times. An example of
such a GC/CL detector is the Thermedics EGIS, which is capable of analysing samples in 18 seconds.
Because of its high sensitivity and excellent selectivity it is a popular system with laboratory researchers and
forensic analysts [NIJ99a] (although 2 to 3 times more expensive than typical IMS systems).
A3.3. Electron Capture Detectors (ECD):
An Electron Capture Detector (ECD) detects explosives and other types of molecules having high electron
affinities (ECD is therefore not compound specific). A vapour sample enters the detector and mixes with a
stream of inert carrier gas, usually helium or argon. The gas flow travels then through an ionisation region,
passing through a chamber containing a radioactive material, usually either nickel-63 (63Ni ) or tritium, that
acts as an electron source as in an IMS. The emitted electrons become thermalised through collisions with
the gas in the chamber, and eventually are collected at an anode. Under equilibrium conditions there is thus a
constant standing current at the anode.
The basic principle behind an ECD is that this standing current is characteristic of the gas mixture being
drawn into the system. Actually, it is reduced if the vapour of an explosive enters the chamber because the
explosive molecules have a high electron affinity and thus a tendency to capture free electrons and form
stable negative ions, leaving fewer electrons to reach the anode. As with a chemiluminescence detector, a gas
chromatograph is placed on the front end of an ECD system to allow temporal identification of different
explosives. For additional information see also [NAV97].
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GC/ECD detectors have a rapid response and typical sensitivities of about 1 ppb for most electron-capturing
compounds (somewhat less than a typical IMS or CL system44, but is still adequate for some applications).
At this point we would in fact have to differentiate better between laboratory and field based instruments.
GC/ECD (field?) detectors tend to cost less than IMS or CL, and to be smaller, lighter, and more easily
portable. Some of the drawbacks include:
 The presence of a small radioactive source, more on the licensing side (see also IMS comments).
 The need for an ultrapure carrier gas, usually contained in a small cylinder; the availability of this
carrier gas can put limits on field applications.
 Lack of specificity and the resulting high rate of false alarms [NAP98b].
A3.4. Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) Sensors:
Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) sensors, which are also usually coupled with a front end GC, are based on
the properties of a piezoelectric crystal that resonates at a specific frequency. When molecules condense on
its surface, the resonant frequency shifts in proportion to the mass of material condensed. The frequency shift
also depends upon the properties of the material being deposited, the surface temperature, and the chemical
nature of the crystal surface. The SAW surface is maintained at sufficiently low temperatures by a
thermoelectric cooler to ensure efficient trapping of the molecules of interest, but can also be heated in order
to desorb vapours and thus clean the surface. The temperature of the surface does actually allow control of
sensor specificity, by preventing adsorption of species with vapour pressures above a certain level. This
feature is useful in distinguishing between high and low vapour pressure explosives. During sampling,
vapours are concentrated in a cryo-trap before being desorbed into the GC for temporal separation.
SAW sensors are for example marketed by Electronic Sensor Technology, Inc.. Total analysis time,
including sample concentration in the cryo-trap, is typically 10 s to 15 s. The system is advertised to have
ppb sensitivity to certain types of explosives, is about the size of a large briefcase, and is operational within
10 min of startup [NIJ99a]. [NIJ98, p. 13] and [YIN99] quote a sensitivity to picogram levels of explosives.
A3.5. Thermo-Redox (TR) Detectors:
Thermo-Redox (TR) technology is based on the thermal decomposition of explosive molecules and the
subsequent reduction of NO2 groups. In practice air containing the explosive sample is drawn into a system
inlet at a rate of approximately 1.5 L/min, and then passes through a concentrator tube which selectively
adsorbs explosive vapour using a proprietary coating on the tube’s coils. The sample is then pyrolyzed to
liberate NO2 molecules, and these molecules are detected using proprietary technology.
The TR system currently marketed by Intelligent Detection Systems (formerly Scintrex), the EVD-3000, is a
hand-held unit which can analyse both vapour and particle samples. Since only the presence of NO2 groups is
detected, this technology cannot distinguish among different explosives and potential interferents that
contain NO2 groups.
A3.6. Field Ion Spectrometry (FIS):
Field Ion Spectrometry (FIS) is a relatively new trace detection technology (1994) that is related to IMS. It
incorporates a unique ion filter using dual transverse fields, which allows interferences to be eliminated
electronically, without the use of GC columns, membranes, or other physical separation methods. FIS is
similar to IMS in that it involves separating and quantifying ions while they are carried in a gas at
atmospheric pressure; also, a small radioactive source is used for ionisation.
                                                     
44
 According to [YIN99, p.35] TEA detectors (i.e. CL) are in fact less sensitive than the ECD by one to two orders of magnitude,
although being much more specific for explosives. [NAV9x] quotes a sensitivity limit of 0.01 ng (= 10 pg) of RDX for a lab-based
Hewlett-Packard GC/ECD device.
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The sole manufacturer of FIS sensors seems to be Mine Safety Applications (MSA). The sensor has no
moving parts except for a small recirculation fan and no consumables except for a replaceable calibrator and
gas purification filters. The manufacturer has reported detection limits for some high explosives in the low
picogram range, as well as a response time of 2 s for a single target molecule plus another 5 s for each
additional target molecule (the device can be tuned so that only specific ions, those of interest, can pass
completely through the analytical volume and into the collection area for detection).
Because of the newness of this technique, the current systems may be better adapted to laboratory research
than to routine field applications, but this could change in the future. The system’s maturity is not clear from
the corresponding Website.
A3.7. Mass Spectrometry (MS):
Mass Spectrometry (MS) has long been one of the most powerful techniques available for laboratory
chemical analysis but is rarely used in routine field applications, also due to system cost, complexity, and the
demands of a high-vacuum system [NAP98b]. MS is basically a magnetic filtering technique: molecules are
first ionised and then passed through a magnetic filter, which allows ions to be identified based on their
charge-to-mass ratio (more details in [YIN99]). In some systems, the MS is connected to a front-end GC.
Mass spectrometers have excellent specificity for identifying different ions, and some (field?) systems have
sub-picogram sensitivity. SCIEX (Toronto, Canada) used for example to build a tandem mass spectrometer
coupled to an ionisation source operating at atmospheric pressure (API-MS/MS) which was very sensitive45
(vapour: a few ppt; particle: picogram amount) and fast. Even lower sensitivities are achievable, e.g. 10 fg
TNT for a API-TOF MS46 system quoted in [YIN99, §2.5.2.3]. Syagen (http://www.syagen.com/) has
developed a QitTof™ (quadrupole ion trap, time-of-flight) mass analyser that is apparently also quite
sensitive.
Several portable systems have been advertised in the last years according to [NIJ98], but not necessarily
designed specifically for explosive detection. An example is the Inficon HAPSITE field portable GC/MS
(http://www.hapsite.com/) (weight: 16 kg, batteries included), designed for on-site analysis of volatile organic
hazardous air pollutants (VOHAPs) in air, soil and water, for emergency response and environmental
applications.
A3.8. Overview:
Table 6 summarises some information on commercially available trace explosives detection systems as listed
in [NIJ99a]. Systems not appearing anymore on the manufacturer’s Websites have been omitted (Barringer
IONSCAN 350, Graseby PLASTEC, Scintrex/EDS EVD-8000). Most of the portals have also not been
included. Needless to say, all information is subject to change. The original cost figures have been retained;
they are to be considered as approximate (and probably in general a lower limit), depending on the exact
options and accessories as well as on the exchange rate. The original Table has been integrated with
information, indicated by the “*” symbol, from the manufacturers’ brochures as well as the [NAV00]
Catalogue.
The USE is coded as follows: PER/PCK/VEH: Personnel, Package and Vehicle search; PORTAL: Personnel
portal (fixed checkpoint portal); POR/LAB: Portable analytical laboratory instrument; NARC/EXPL:
simultaneous narcotics and explosives. Detector Type: Vap stands for vapour detector, Part for Particle
detector. Advertised Sensitivity/Detection Time: A stands for Analysis time, S for Sampling time.
                                                     
45
 J. McFee, DRES, Canada, Private Comm., July 2000. See also [YIN99, §2.5.2.1], and: W. R. Stott, W. R. Davidson, R. Sleeman,
High-specificity chemical detection of explosives by tandem mass spectrometry, Proc. SPIE Vol. 1824, Applications of Signal and
Image Processing in Explosives Detection Systems, pp. 68-78, 1992. The system was apparently marketed by BAe/SCIEX as the
CONDOR Contraband System.
46
 Atmospheric Pressure Ionization Time-Of-Flight Mass Spectrometer.
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Trace Detector Cost
in k$
Detector
Type
Advertised Sensitivity/
Detection Time
Use Size /
Weight
EXPRAY Field Test Kit
Model M1553
0.25 Colour 20 ng of most nitrated high
explosives
PER/PCK/
VEH
3 aerosol
cans, 1 lb.
Ion Track Instruments
Exfinder 152
5 GC/ECD
Vap
Most nitrated high
Explosives
A: 1 sec*
PER/PCK/
VEH
2”x2”x16”
1.5 lb.
JGW International, Ltd.
Graseby GVD4
5 GC/ECD
Vap
Explosive vapour
Exceeding 1 part in 109
PER/PCK/
VEH
2”x3”x13”
1.6 lb.
XID Corporation
XID Model T-54
13 GC/ECD 0.01 ppb PER/PCK/
VEH
4”x12”x17”
18 lb.
JGW International, Ltd.
Graseby GVD6
16 IMS
Vap
Explosive vapour exceeding 1
part in 109
(1 part in 1010 by volume*)
PER/PCK/
VEH
22”x4”x13”
21 lb.
Ion Track Instruments
Model 97
20 GC/ECD
Vap (+Part.)
Most nitrated high
Explosives
A: 3 sec*
PER/PCK/
VEH
14”x19”x6”
40 lb.
Scintrex/IDS
EVD-3000
23 TR
Vap+Part
< 1 ppb (< 50 ppt for EGDN?)
< 100 nanogram for Part.
A: 10 sec, S: 5-30 sec
PER/PCK/
VEH
4”x5”x20”
7 lb.
Electronic Sensor Tech.,
Inc.
EST Model 4100
25 GC/SAW
Vap?
100 ppb? (low ppb*)
A(Total): 10-15 sec
PER/PCK/
VEH
10”x20”x14”
35 lb.
MSA Instrument Division
FIS
29 FIS 10 to 1000 ppt PER/PCK/
VEH
24”x15”x13”
20 lb.
Ion Track Instruments
ITMS Vapour Tracer
38 IMS (ITMS)
Vap
100 to 300 pg (10 to 50 pg*)
A+S(?): 4-10 sec*
PER/PCK/
VEH
13”x5”x5”
7 lb.
Ion Track Instruments
ITEMISER
44 IMS (ITMS)
Part?
100 to 300 pg (<30 pg*)
A: 3-8 sec
PER/PCK/
VEH
18”x21”x14”
43 lb.
Ion Track Instruments
Model 85 Entry Scan
52 GC/ECD 1 part EGDN vapour in 1011
parts air
PORTAL 80”x33”x60”
600 lb.
Ion Track Instruments
Model 85 Dual Scan
52 GC/ECD 1 part EGDN vapour in 1011
parts air
PORTAL 80”x33”x60”
600 lb.
Barringer Instruments,
Inc.
IONSCAN 400
60 IMS
Part
50-200 pg
A: 5-8 sec
PER/PCK/
VEH
22”x13”x12”
60 lb.
Intelligent Detection
Systems
ORION
70 GC/IMS
Vap+Part?
pg to ng for particulates
ppt for vapours. A: 6 sec
PER/PCK/
VEH
40”x20”x30”
240 lb.
VIKING Instruments, Inc.
Spectra Trak
70 GC/MS Low ppb
By volume
POR/
LAB
24”x16”x21”
150 lb.
Intelligent Detection
Systems
ORION Mail Scanner
75 GC/IMS pg to ng MAIL
screening
40”x20”x30”
240 lb.
Intelligent Detection
Systems
SIRIUS
75 GC/IMS pg to ng NARC/
EXPL
40”x20”x30”
240 lb.
Thermedics Detection,
Inc.
EGIS Model 3000
150 GC/CL
Vap+Part
All nitrogen based
Explosives plus taggants
A: 18 sec, S:? (10-20 sec?)
PER/PCK/
VEH
51”x25”x26”
400 lb.
Intelligent Detection
Systems
ORION Plus
155 GC/IMS pg to ng PER/PCK/
VEH
40”x20”x30”
240 lb.
Table 6: Commercially available Trace explosives detection systems (adapted from [NIJ99a], Table 4; *: info
from the manufacturers’ brochures and/or [NAV00]; 1 lb=1 pound=0.454 kg, 1”=1 inch=2.54 cm)
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The following systems represent an addition to those listed in the original [NIJ99a] table, most of them
having been marketed since:
 Barringer Instruments, Inc.:
IONSCAN 400B: IMS, weight 26 kg, dim. 40x34x32 cm. “Compact” version of IONSCAN 400.
GC-IONSCAN: GC-IMS, “fully transportable field screening instrument” (manufacturer’s notice),
weight 32 kg, dim. 41x53x45 cm, analysis time < 5 min (one minute example shown for explosives).
SABRE 2000: IMS, weight 2.6 kg, dim. 33x11.5x13cm, detection limit for most substances: low ng
range. Vap+Part, A: 10-15 sec.
 SIBEL-TDA:
MO-2M/DOG100: Portable explosives vapour detector MO-2M based on Non-Linear Dependence
of Ion Mobility on electric field (NLDM). Joint SIBEL-TDA Russian-French collaboration (SIBEL
Ltd., Novosibirsk, Russia; TDA: Thomson-CSF/DaimlerChrysler Aerospace Joint Venture, which
markets the detector as DOG100).
Sensitivity: 0.01 ppb for TNT (10–13g /cm3 = 0.1 pg/cm3)47, weight 1.3 kg (hand held unit), dim.
9x10x31 cm, A+S: 2 sec [RAN99]. Marketed as EXPLORER 2000 in the US.
 I.U.T. (Institut für Umwelttechnologien):
IMS, weight 6 kg, Vap (+Part), A+S: few secs, GC version available. Price from 30 kDEM, battery
powered, also versions for monitoring of chemical warfare agents and narcotics.
 Thermedics Detection, Inc.:
EGIS II (possible successor to EGIS model 3000?): GC-CL, sensitivity quoted at 300 pg in [NAV00].
 Nomadics:
FIDO system prototype aimed at landmine detection (see http://www.nomadics.com/), based on an
extremely sensitive fluorescent polymer. Sensitivity to TNT in the low femtogram range was achieved
(say around 10 fg, 1 fg = 10–15 g), equivalent to a concentration, based on their sampling approach, of
0.1 ppt (or 1 fg/cm3 = 10–15g /cm3)48.
A3.9. Evaluation of Equipment (for Law Enforcement Applications):
It is worth mentioning that the [NIJ99a] authors have evaluated (see Ch. 4) the previously mentioned
systems, trying to define “ideal” and “nominal” characteristics to then classify each detector (when possible).
This enumeration is intended only to provide information, whereby the corresponding matrix can serve as an
additional starting point in making a procurement decision. This evaluation is specific to Law Enforcement
applications.
                                                     
47
 [RAN99] does in fact quote a sensitivity of better than 10–15 g/cm3  or 0.1 ppt, with a S/N ratio 5-6, for a “MO-3” detector (?!).
48
 An even lower value of 0.01 ppt = 10 ppq (parts per quadrillion) is quoted on the Nomadics Website as of Sept. 2000.
